17 ideas
10838 | To explain a concept, we need its purpose, not just its rules of usage [Dummett] |
6950 | You can be rational with undetected or minor inconsistencies [Harman] |
6954 | A coherent conceptual scheme contains best explanations of most of your beliefs [Harman] |
10837 | It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements [Dummett] |
10840 | We must be able to specify truths in a precise language, like winning moves in a game [Dummett] |
19171 | Tarski's truth is like rules for winning games, without saying what 'winning' means [Dummett, by Davidson] |
16078 | Clay is intrinsically and atomically the same as statue (and that lacks 'modal properties') [Rudder Baker] |
16077 | The clay is not a statue - it borrows that property from the statue it constitutes [Rudder Baker] |
16080 | Is it possible for two things that are identical to become two separate things? [Rudder Baker] |
16076 | Constitution is not identity, as consideration of essential predicates shows [Rudder Baker] |
16081 | The constitution view gives a unified account of the relation of persons/bodies, statues/bronze etc [Rudder Baker] |
16082 | Statues essentially have relational properties lacked by lumps [Rudder Baker] |
6955 | Enumerative induction is inference to the best explanation [Harman] |
6952 | Induction is 'defeasible', since additional information can invalidate it [Harman] |
6953 | All reasoning is inductive, and deduction only concerns implication [Harman] |
6951 | Ordinary rationality is conservative, starting from where your beliefs currently are [Harman] |
10839 | You can't infer a dog's abstract concepts from its behaviour [Dummett] |