29 ideas
4036 | What matters is not how many entities we postulate, but how many kinds of entities [Armstrong, by Mellor/Oliver] |
15754 | Without properties we would be unable to express the laws of nature [Armstrong] |
4034 | Whether we apply 'cold' or 'hot' to an object is quite separate from its change of temperature [Armstrong] |
8535 | To the claim that every predicate has a property, start by eliminating failure of application of predicate [Armstrong] |
8537 | Tropes fall into classes, because exact similarity is symmetrical and transitive [Armstrong] |
8538 | Trope theory needs extra commitments, to symmetry and non-transitivity, unless resemblance is exact [Armstrong] |
8539 | Universals are required to give a satisfactory account of the laws of nature [Armstrong] |
8529 | Deniers of properties and relations rely on either predicates or on classes [Armstrong] |
8532 | Resemblances must be in certain 'respects', and they seem awfully like properties [Armstrong] |
8530 | Change of temperature in objects is quite independent of the predicates 'hot' and 'cold' [Armstrong] |
8536 | We want to know what constituents of objects are grounds for the application of predicates [Armstrong] |
8531 | In most sets there is no property common to all the members [Armstrong] |
16078 | Clay is intrinsically and atomically the same as statue (and that lacks 'modal properties') [Rudder Baker] |
16077 | The clay is not a statue - it borrows that property from the statue it constitutes [Rudder Baker] |
16080 | Is it possible for two things that are identical to become two separate things? [Rudder Baker] |
16076 | Constitution is not identity, as consideration of essential predicates shows [Rudder Baker] |
16081 | The constitution view gives a unified account of the relation of persons/bodies, statues/bronze etc [Rudder Baker] |
16082 | Statues essentially have relational properties lacked by lumps [Rudder Baker] |
15753 | Essences might support Resemblance Nominalism, but they are too coarse and ill-defined [Armstrong] |
17064 | 1: Coherence is a symmetrical relation between two propositions [Thagard, by Smart] |
17065 | 2: An explanation must wholly cohere internally, and with the new fact [Thagard, by Smart] |
17066 | 3: If an analogous pair explain another analogous pair, then they all cohere [Thagard, by Smart] |
17067 | 4: For coherence, observation reports have a degree of intrinsic acceptability [Thagard, by Smart] |
17068 | 5: Contradictory propositions incohere [Thagard, by Smart] |
17069 | 6: A proposition's acceptability depends on its coherence with a system [Thagard, by Smart] |
8533 | Predicates need ontological correlates to ensure that they apply [Armstrong] |
4035 | There must be some explanation of why certain predicates are applicable to certain objects [Armstrong] |
8541 | Regularities theories are poor on causal connections, counterfactuals and probability [Armstrong] |
8540 | The introduction of sparse properties avoids the regularity theory's problem with 'grue' [Armstrong] |