Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Why Constitution is not Identity', 'Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo' and 'The Elements of Law'

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32 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / b. Seventeenth century philosophy
Hobbes created English-language philosophy [Hobbes, by Tuck]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
We are coerced into assent to a truth by reason's violence [Aquinas]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
The mind is compelled by necessary truths, but not by contingent truths [Aquinas]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
For the mind Good is one truth among many, and Truth is one good among many [Aquinas]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
Clay is intrinsically and atomically the same as statue (and that lacks 'modal properties') [Rudder Baker]
The clay is not a statue - it borrows that property from the statue it constitutes [Rudder Baker]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
Is it possible for two things that are identical to become two separate things? [Rudder Baker]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
Constitution is not identity, as consideration of essential predicates shows [Rudder Baker]
The constitution view gives a unified account of the relation of persons/bodies, statues/bronze etc [Rudder Baker]
Statues essentially have relational properties lacked by lumps [Rudder Baker]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
The qualities of the world are mere appearances; reality is the motions which cause them [Hobbes]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Evidence is conception, which is imagination, which proceeds from the senses [Hobbes]
Experience can't prove universal truths [Hobbes]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Knowledge may be based on senses, but we needn't sense all our knowledge [Aquinas]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
If we saw something as totally and utterly good, we would be compelled to will it [Aquinas]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
Nothing can be willed except what is good, but good is very varied, and so choices are unpredictable [Aquinas]
However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit [Aquinas]
Since will is a reasoning power, it can entertain opposites, so it is not compelled to embrace one of them [Aquinas]
The will is not compelled to move, even if pleasant things are set before it [Aquinas]
Because the will moves by examining alternatives, it doesn't compel itself to will [Aquinas]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
We must admit that when the will is not willing something, the first movement to will must come from outside the will [Aquinas]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The will must aim at happiness, but can choose the means [Aquinas]
We don't have to will even perfect good, because we can choose not to think of it [Aquinas]
The will can only want what it thinks is good [Aquinas]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
It is an error that reason should control the passions, which give right guidance on their own [Hobbes, by Tuck]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Good and evil are what please us; goodness and badness the powers causing them [Hobbes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Without free will not only is ethical action meaningless, but also planning, commanding, praising and blaming [Aquinas]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Self-preservation is basic, and people judge differently about that, implying ethical relativism [Hobbes, by Tuck]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
Hobbes shifted from talk of 'the good' to talk of 'rights' [Hobbes, by Tuck]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Good applies to goals, just as truth applies to ideas in the mind [Aquinas]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
Even a sufficient cause doesn't compel its effect, because interference could interrupt the process [Aquinas]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
The attributes of God just show our inability to conceive his nature [Hobbes]