Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Academica', 'Constructibility and Mathematical Existence' and 'Mind and Body'

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26 ideas

2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Dialectic is speech cast in the form of logical argument [Cicero]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
There cannot be more than one truth [Cicero]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
We could talk of open sentences, instead of sets [Chihara, by Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Dialectic assumes that all statements are either true or false, but self-referential paradoxes are a big problem [Cicero]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
Chihara's system is a variant of type theory, from which he can translate sentences [Chihara, by Shapiro]
We can replace type theory with open sentences and a constructibility quantifier [Chihara, by Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / a. Constructivism
Introduce a constructibility quantifiers (Cx)Φ - 'it is possible to construct an x such that Φ' [Chihara, by Shapiro]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
A weaker kind of reductionism than direct translation is the use of 'bridge laws' [Kirk,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
If we have complete healthy senses, what more could the gods give us? [Cicero]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
How can there be a memory of what is false? [Cicero]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
Every true presentation can have a false one of the same quality [Cicero]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness
Maybe we should see intentionality and consciousness as a single problem, not two [Kirk,R]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
If a bird captures a worm, we could say its behaviour is 'about' the worm [Kirk,R]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Behaviourism says intentionality is an external relation; language of thought says it's internal [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
Dualism implies some brain events with no physical cause, and others with no physical effect [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 1. Behaviourism
Behaviourism seems a good theory for intentional states, but bad for phenomenal ones [Kirk,R]
Behaviourism offers a good alternative to simplistic unitary accounts of mental relationships [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
In 'holistic' behaviourism we say a mental state is a complex of many dispositions [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
The inverted spectrum idea is often regarded as an objection to behaviourism [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
All meaningful psychological statements can be translated into physics [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
Instead of representation by sentences, it can be by a distribution of connectionist strengths [Kirk,R]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
If mental states are multiply realisable, they could not be translated into physical terms [Kirk,R]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
It seems unlikely that most concepts are innate, if a theory must be understood to grasp them [Kirk,R]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
For behaviourists language is just a special kind of behaviour [Kirk,R]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Behaviourists doubt whether reference is a single type of relation [Kirk,R]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Virtues must be very detached, to avoid being motivated by pleasure [Cicero]