76 ideas
| 18559 | Philosophy is empty if it does not in some way depend on matters of fact [Machery] |
| 2653 | If the parts of the universe are subject to the law of nature, the whole universe must also be subject to it [Cicero] |
| 21566 | 'Propositional functions' are ambiguous until the variable is given a value [Russell] |
| 21567 | 'All judgements made by Epimenedes are true' needs the judgements to be of the same type [Russell] |
| 23457 | Type theory cannot identify features across levels (because such predicates break the rules) [Morris,M on Russell] |
| 21556 | Classes are defined by propositional functions, and functions are typed, with an axiom of reducibility [Russell, by Lackey] |
| 21568 | A one-variable function is only 'predicative' if it is one order above its arguments [Russell] |
| 18564 | Do categories store causal knowledge, or typical properties, or knowledge of individuals? [Machery] |
| 18604 | Are quick and slow categorisation the same process, or quite different? [Machery] |
| 18573 | For each category of objects (such as 'dog') an individual seems to have several concepts [Machery] |
| 18602 | A thing is classified if its features are likely to be generated by that category's causal laws [Machery] |
| 18565 | There may be ad hoc categories, such as the things to pack in your suitcase for a trip [Machery] |
| 18570 | There may be several ways to individuate things like concepts [Machery] |
| 18616 | If a term doesn't pick out a kind, keeping it may block improvements in classification [Machery] |
| 18614 | Vertical arguments say eliminate a term if it picks out different natural kinds in different theories [Machery] |
| 18615 | Horizontal arguments say eliminate a term if it fails to pick out a natural kind [Machery] |
| 18609 | Psychologists use 'induction' as generalising a property from one category to another [Machery] |
| 18610 | 'Ampliative' induction infers that all members of a category have a feature found in some of them [Machery] |
| 2628 | Why would mind mix with matter if it didn't need it? [Cicero] |
| 18562 | Connectionists cannot distinguish concept-memories from their background, or the processes [Machery] |
| 18561 | We can identify a set of cognitive capacities which are 'higher order' [Machery] |
| 18574 | Concepts for categorisation and for induction may be quite different [Machery] |
| 18588 | Concept theories aim at their knowledge, processes, format, acquisition, and location [Machery] |
| 18611 | We should abandon 'concept', and just use 'prototype', 'exemplar' and 'theory' [Machery] |
| 18567 | In the philosophy of psychology, concepts are usually introduced as constituents of thoughts [Machery] |
| 18569 | In philosophy theories of concepts explain how our propositional attitudes have content [Machery] |
| 18563 | By 'concept' psychologists mean various sorts of representation or structure [Machery] |
| 18558 | Concept theorists examine their knowledge, format, processes, acquisition and location [Machery] |
| 18557 | Psychologists treat concepts as long-term knowledge bodies which lead to judgements [Machery] |
| 18560 | Psychologist treat concepts as categories [Machery] |
| 18592 | The concepts OBJECT or AGENT may be innate [Machery] |
| 18566 | Concepts should contain working memory, not long-term, because they control behaviour [Machery] |
| 18584 | One hybrid theory combines a core definition with a prototype for identification [Machery] |
| 18585 | Heterogeneous concepts might have conflicting judgements, where hybrid theories will not [Machery] |
| 18578 | Concepts as definitions was rejected, and concepts as prototypes, exemplars or theories proposed [Machery] |
| 18575 | The concepts for a class typically include prototypes, and exemplars, and theories [Machery] |
| 18591 | Classical theory can't explain facts like typical examples being categorised quicker [Machery] |
| 18583 | Many categories don't seem to have a definition [Machery] |
| 18590 | Classical theory implies variety in processing times, but this does not generally occur [Machery] |
| 18594 | Knowing typical properties of things is especially useful in induction [Machery] |
| 18593 | The term 'prototype' is used for both typical category members, and the representation [Machery] |
| 18595 | Prototype theories are based on computation of similarities with the prototype [Machery] |
| 18596 | Prototype theorists don't tell us how we select the appropriate prototype [Machery] |
| 18603 | Maybe concepts are not the typical properties, but the ideal properties [Machery] |
| 18605 | It is more efficient to remember the prototype, than repeatedly create it from exemplars [Machery] |
| 18606 | The prototype view predicts that typical members are easier to categorise [Machery] |
| 18597 | Concepts as exemplars are based on the knowledge of properties of each particular [Machery] |
| 18598 | Exemplar theories need to explain how the relevant properties are selected from a multitude of them [Machery] |
| 18599 | In practice, known examples take priority over the rest of the set of exemplars [Machery] |
| 18600 | Theory Theory says category concepts are knowledge stores explaining membership [Machery] |
| 18601 | Theory Theory says concepts are explanatory knowledge, and concepts form domains [Machery] |
| 18607 | Theory theorists rely on best explanation, rather than on similarities [Machery] |
| 18608 | If categorisation is not by similarity, it seems to rely on what properties things might have [Machery] |
| 18587 | The theory account is sometimes labelled as 'knowledge' or 'explanation' in approach [Machery] |
| 18577 | The word 'grandmother' may be two concepts, with a prototype and a definition [Machery] |
| 18589 | For behaviourists concepts are dispositions to link category members to names [Machery] |
| 18612 | Americans are more inclined to refer causally than the Chinese are [Machery] |
| 20814 | Eloquence educates, exhorts, comforts, distracts and unites us, and raises us from savagery [Cicero] |
| 2640 | We have the death penalty, but still have thousands of robbers [Cicero] |
| 2652 | Some regard nature simply as an irrational force that imparts movement [Cicero] |
| 18613 | Artifacts can be natural kinds, when they are the object of historical enquiry [Machery] |
| 2645 | Why shouldn't the gods fear their own destruction? [Cicero] |
| 2627 | I wonder whether loss of reverence for the gods would mean the end of all virtue [Cicero] |
| 2651 | God doesn't obey the laws of nature; they are subject to the law of God [Cicero] |
| 2634 | It seems clear to me that we have an innate idea of the divine [Cicero] |
| 2636 | Many primitive people know nothing of the gods [Cicero] |
| 2647 | It is obvious from order that someone is in charge, as when we visit a gymnasium [Cicero] |
| 2650 | If a person cannot feel the power of God when looking at the stars, they are probably incapable of feeling [Cicero] |
| 2655 | If the barbarians of Britain saw a complex machine, they would be baffled, but would know it was designed [Cicero] |
| 2656 | Chance is no more likely to create the world than spilling lots of letters is likely to create a famous poem [Cicero] |
| 2657 | If everything with regular movement and order is divine, then recurrent illnesses must be divine [Cicero] |
| 2638 | Either the gods are identical, or one is more beautiful than another [Cicero] |
| 2635 | The gods are happy, so virtuous, so rational, so must have human shape [Cicero] |
| 2641 | Why believe in gods if you have never seen them? [Cicero] |
| 2659 | The lists of good men who have suffered and bad men who have prospered are endless [Cicero] |
| 2658 | The gods blame men for having vices, but they could have given us enough reason to avoid them [Cicero] |