Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Academica', 'Change in View: Principles of Reasoning' and 'Psychophysical supervenience'

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18 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
The rules of reasoning are not the rules of logic [Harman]
It is a principle of reasoning not to clutter your mind with trivialities [Harman]
If there is a great cost to avoiding inconsistency, we learn to reason our way around it [Harman]
Logic has little relevance to reasoning, except when logical conclusions are immediate [Harman]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Implication just accumulates conclusions, but inference may also revise our views [Harman]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Dialectic is speech cast in the form of logical argument [Cicero]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
There cannot be more than one truth [Cicero]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Dialectic assumes that all statements are either true or false, but self-referential paradoxes are a big problem [Cicero]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
Extrinsic properties, unlike intrinsics, imply the existence of a separate object [Kim, by Lewis]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
The Gambler's Fallacy (ten blacks, so red is due) overemphasises the early part of a sequence [Harman]
High probability premises need not imply high probability conclusions [Harman]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
We strongly desire to believe what is true, even though logic does not require it [Harman]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
If we have complete healthy senses, what more could the gods give us? [Cicero]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
How can there be a memory of what is false? [Cicero]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
In revision of belief, we need to keep track of justifications for foundations, but not for coherence [Harman]
Coherence is intelligible connections, especially one element explaining another [Harman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
Every true presentation can have a false one of the same quality [Cicero]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Virtues must be very detached, to avoid being motivated by pleasure [Cicero]