38 ideas
2661 | Dialectic is speech cast in the form of logical argument [Cicero] |
2673 | There cannot be more than one truth [Cicero] |
14273 | Conditional Proof is only valid if we accept the truth-functional reading of 'if' [Edgington] |
2669 | Dialectic assumes that all statements are either true or false, but self-referential paradoxes are a big problem [Cicero] |
14281 | A thing works like formal probability if all the options sum to 100% [Edgington] |
14284 | Conclusion improbability can't exceed summed premise improbability in valid arguments [Edgington] |
14270 | Simple indicatives about past, present or future do seem to form a single semantic kind [Edgington] |
14269 | Maybe forward-looking indicatives are best classed with the subjunctives [Edgington] |
14275 | Truth-function problems don't show up in mathematics [Edgington] |
14274 | Inferring conditionals from disjunctions or negated conjunctions gives support to truth-functionalism [Edgington] |
14276 | The truth-functional view makes conditionals with unlikely antecedents likely to be true [Edgington] |
14290 | Doctor:'If patient still alive, change dressing'; Nurse:'Either dead patient, or change dressing'; kills patient! [Edgington] |
14271 | Non-truth-functionalist say 'If A,B' is false if A is T and B is F, but deny that is always true for TT,FT and FF [Edgington] |
14272 | I say "If you touch that wire you'll get a shock"; you don't touch it. How can that make the conditional true? [Edgington] |
14282 | On the supposition view, believe if A,B to the extent that A&B is nearly as likely as A [Edgington] |
14278 | Truth-functionalists support some conditionals which we assert, but should not actually believe [Edgington] |
14287 | Does 'If A,B' say something different in each context, because of the possibiites there? [Edgington] |
2664 | If we have complete healthy senses, what more could the gods give us? [Cicero] |
2665 | How can there be a memory of what is false? [Cicero] |
20800 | Every true presentation can have a false one of the same quality [Cicero] |
3772 | The will, in the beginning, is entirely produced by desire [Mill] |
3769 | With early training, any absurdity or evil may be given the power of conscience [Mill] |
3767 | Motive shows the worth of the agent, but not of the action [Mill] |
2672 | Virtues must be very detached, to avoid being motivated by pleasure [Cicero] |
3771 | Virtues only have value because they achieve some further end [Mill] |
3768 | Orthodox morality is the only one which feels obligatory [Mill] |
3764 | Actions are right if they promote pleasure, wrong if they promote pain [Mill] |
3776 | Utilitarianism only works if everybody has a totally equal right to happiness [Mill] |
7202 | The English believe in the task of annihilating evil for the victory of good [Nietzsche on Mill] |
5935 | Mill's qualities of pleasure is an admission that there are other good states of mind than pleasure [Ross on Mill] |
3766 | Better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied [Mill] |
3765 | Only pleasure and freedom from pain are desirable as ends [Mill] |
3763 | Ultimate goods such as pleasure can never be proved to be good [Mill] |
3770 | General happiness is only desirable because individuals desire their own happiness [Mill] |
6697 | Moral rules protecting human welfare are more vital than local maxims [Mill] |
3774 | Rights are a matter of justice, not of benevolence [Mill] |
3773 | No individual has the right to receive our benevolence [Mill] |
3775 | A right is a valid claim to society's protection [Mill] |