17 ideas
| 2661 | Dialectic is speech cast in the form of logical argument [Cicero] |
| 2673 | There cannot be more than one truth [Cicero] |
| 10928 | Maybe we can quantify modally if the objects are intensional, but it seems unlikely [Quine] |
| 2669 | Dialectic assumes that all statements are either true or false, but self-referential paradoxes are a big problem [Cicero] |
| 10925 | Failure of substitutivity shows that a personal name is not purely referential [Quine] |
| 10926 | Quantifying into referentially opaque contexts often produces nonsense [Quine] |
| 10930 | Quantification into modal contexts requires objects to have an essence [Quine] |
| 14645 | To be necessarily greater than 7 is not a trait of 7, but depends on how 7 is referred to [Quine] |
| 9201 | Whether 9 is necessarily greater than 7 depends on how '9' is described [Quine, by Fine,K] |
| 10927 | Necessity only applies to objects if they are distinctively specified [Quine] |
| 9203 | We can't quantify in modal contexts, because the modality depends on descriptions, not objects [Quine, by Fine,K] |
| 2664 | If we have complete healthy senses, what more could the gods give us? [Cicero] |
| 2665 | How can there be a memory of what is false? [Cicero] |
| 20800 | Every true presentation can have a false one of the same quality [Cicero] |
| 22110 | Demonstration provides depth of understanding and explanation (rather than foundations) [Kretzmann/Stump] |
| 2672 | Virtues must be very detached, to avoid being motivated by pleasure [Cicero] |
| 10931 | We can't say 'necessarily if x is in water then x dissolves' if we can't quantify modally [Quine] |