Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum')', 'On Mental Entities' and 'On What There Is'

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51 ideas

2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 5. Fallacy of Composition
If the parts of the universe are subject to the law of nature, the whole universe must also be subject to it [Cicero]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
We study bound variables not to know reality, but to know what reality language asserts [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / f. Names eliminated
Canonical notation needs quantification, variables and predicates, but not names [Quine, by Orenstein]
Quine extended Russell's defining away of definite descriptions, to also define away names [Quine, by Orenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
Names can be converted to descriptions, and Russell showed how to eliminate those [Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Logicists cheerfully accept reference to bound variables and all sorts of abstract entities [Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
Formalism says maths is built of meaningless notations; these build into rules which have meaning [Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
Intuitionism says classes are invented, and abstract entities are constructed from specified ingredients [Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / c. Conceptualism
Conceptualism holds that there are universals but they are mind-made [Quine]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
For Quine, there is only one way to exist [Quine, by Shapiro]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
The idea of a thing and the idea of existence are two sides of the same coin [Quine, by Crane]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Quine rests existence on bound variables, because he thinks singular terms can be analysed away [Quine, by Hale]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
Quine's ontology is wrong; his question is scientific, and his answer is partly philosophical [Fine,K on Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
What actually exists does not, of course, depend on language [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
To be is to be the value of a variable, which amounts to being in the range of reference of a pronoun [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
Fictional quantification has no ontology, so we study ontology through scientific theories [Quine, by Orenstein]
An ontology is like a scientific theory; we accept the simplest scheme that fits disorderly experiences [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
If commitment rests on first-order logic, we obviously lose the ontology concerning predication [Maudlin on Quine]
If to be is to be the value of a variable, we must already know the values available [Jacquette on Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Realism, conceptualism and nominalism in medieval universals reappear in maths as logicism, intuitionism and formalism [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
There is no entity called 'redness', and that some things are red is ultimate and irreducible [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
Quine has argued that predicates do not have any ontological commitment [Quine, by Armstrong]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Treating scattered sensations as single objects simplifies our understanding of experience [Quine]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
Quine's indispensability argument said arguments for abstracta were a posteriori [Quine, by Yablo]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Can an unactualized possible have self-identity, and be distinct from other possibles? [Quine]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
We can never translate our whole language of objects into phenomenalism [Quine]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
Sense-data are dubious abstractions, with none of the plausibility of tables [Quine]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
Empiricism says evidence rests on the senses, but that insight is derived from science [Quine]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
Why would mind mix with matter if it didn't need it? [Cicero]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
There is an attempt to give a verificationist account of meaning, without the error of reducing everything to sensations [Dennett on Quine]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
The word 'meaning' is only useful when talking about significance or about synonymy [Quine]
I do not believe there is some abstract entity called a 'meaning' which we can 'have' [Quine]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Quine relates predicates to their objects, by being 'true of' them [Quine, by Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Eloquence educates, exhorts, comforts, distracts and unites us, and raises us from savagery [Cicero]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / c. Deterrence of crime
We have the death penalty, but still have thousands of robbers [Cicero]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Some regard nature simply as an irrational force that imparts movement [Cicero]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
Why shouldn't the gods fear their own destruction? [Cicero]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
I wonder whether loss of reverence for the gods would mean the end of all virtue [Cicero]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
God doesn't obey the laws of nature; they are subject to the law of God [Cicero]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
It seems clear to me that we have an innate idea of the divine [Cicero]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
Many primitive people know nothing of the gods [Cicero]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
It is obvious from order that someone is in charge, as when we visit a gymnasium [Cicero]
If a person cannot feel the power of God when looking at the stars, they are probably incapable of feeling [Cicero]
If the barbarians of Britain saw a complex machine, they would be baffled, but would know it was designed [Cicero]
Chance is no more likely to create the world than spilling lots of letters is likely to create a famous poem [Cicero]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / c. Teleological Proof critique
If everything with regular movement and order is divine, then recurrent illnesses must be divine [Cicero]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 1. Monotheism
Either the gods are identical, or one is more beautiful than another [Cicero]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
The gods are happy, so virtuous, so rational, so must have human shape [Cicero]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Why believe in gods if you have never seen them? [Cicero]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
The lists of good men who have suffered and bad men who have prospered are endless [Cicero]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / b. Human Evil
The gods blame men for having vices, but they could have given us enough reason to avoid them [Cicero]