Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Individuals without Sortals', 'Manuscript remains' and 'Tarski's Theory of Truth'

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27 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Philosophers can't be religious, and don't need to be; philosophy is perilous but free [Schopenhauer]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
The notion of truth is to help us make use of the utterances of others [Field,H]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
In the early 1930s many philosophers thought truth was not scientific [Field,H]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
Tarski reduced truth to reference or denotation [Field,H, by Hart,WD]
Tarski really explained truth in terms of denoting, predicating and satisfied functions [Field,H]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
Tarski just reduced truth to some other undefined semantic notions [Field,H]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
Tarski gives us the account of truth needed to build a group of true sentences in a model [Field,H]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
Model theory is unusual in restricting the range of the quantifiers [Field,H]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope [Ayers]
If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals? [Ayers]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them [Ayers]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers]
We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers]
Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers]
Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers]
Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
'Valence' and 'gene' had to be reduced to show their compatibility with physicalism [Field,H]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Field says reference is a causal physical relation between mental states and objects [Field,H, by Putnam]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
As the subject of willing I am wretched, but absorption in knowledge is bliss [Schopenhauer]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
To deduce morality from reason is blasphemy, because it is holy, and far above reason [Schopenhauer]