Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Individuals without Sortals', 'works' and 'Noneism or Allism?'

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21 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
We can quantify over fictions by quantifying for real over their names [Lewis]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
We could quantify over impossible objects - as bundles of properties [Lewis]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope [Ayers]
If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals? [Ayers]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
'Allists' embrace the existence of all controversial entities; 'noneists' reject all but the obvious ones [Lewis]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
We can't accept a use of 'existence' that says only some of the things there are actually exist [Lewis]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them [Ayers]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers]
We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers]
Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers]
Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers]
Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 3. Intentional Stance
If mind is just an explanation, the explainer must have beliefs [Rey on Dennett]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
You couldn't drive a car without folk psychology [Dennett]