53 ideas
19275 | You cannot understand what exists without understanding possibility and necessity [Hale] |
2098 | The principle of sufficient reason is needed if we are to proceed from maths to physics [Leibniz] |
3646 | There is always a reason why things are thus rather than otherwise [Leibniz] |
2104 | No reason could limit the quantity of matter, so there is no limit [Leibniz] |
19291 | A canonical defintion specifies the type of thing, and what distinguish this specimen [Hale] |
19297 | The two Barcan principles are easily proved in fairly basic modal logic [Hale] |
19301 | With a negative free logic, we can dispense with the Barcan formulae [Hale] |
19296 | If second-order variables range over sets, those are just objects; properties and relations aren't sets [Hale] |
19289 | Maybe conventionalism applies to meaning, but not to the truth of propositions expressed [Hale] |
19298 | Unlike axiom proofs, natural deduction proofs needn't focus on logical truths and theorems [Hale] |
17518 | Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope [Ayers] |
17516 | If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals? [Ayers] |
19295 | Add Hume's principle to logic, to get numbers; arithmetic truths rest on the nature of the numbers [Hale] |
17520 | Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them [Ayers] |
19281 | Interesting supervenience must characterise the base quite differently from what supervenes on it [Hale] |
19385 | All simply substances are in harmony, because they all represent the one universe [Leibniz] |
19278 | There is no gap between a fact that p, and it is true that p; so we only have the truth-condtions for p [Hale] |
21346 | The ratio between two lines can't be a feature of one, and cannot be in both [Leibniz] |
17519 | To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers] |
17510 | Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers] |
17522 | We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers] |
17515 | Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers] |
17511 | Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers] |
17517 | Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers] |
17513 | If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers] |
19302 | If a chair could be made of slightly different material, that could lead to big changes [Hale] |
17523 | Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers] |
17521 | You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers] |
17514 | Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers] |
17509 | Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers] |
17512 | If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers] |
19290 | Absolute necessities are necessarily necessary [Hale] |
19286 | 'Absolute necessity' is when there is no restriction on the things which necessitate p [Hale] |
19288 | Logical and metaphysical necessities differ in their vocabulary, and their underlying entities [Hale] |
19285 | Logical necessity is something which is true, no matter what else is the case [Hale] |
19287 | Maybe each type of logic has its own necessity, gradually becoming broader [Hale] |
19282 | It seems that we cannot show that modal facts depend on non-modal facts [Hale] |
19276 | The big challenge for essentialist views of modality is things having necessary existence [Hale] |
19293 | Essentialism doesn't explain necessity reductively; it explains all necessities in terms of a few basic natures [Hale] |
19294 | If necessity derives from essences, how do we explain the necessary existence of essences? [Hale] |
19279 | What are these worlds, that being true in all of them makes something necessary? [Hale] |
19299 | Possible worlds make every proposition true or false, which endorses classical logic [Hale] |
19300 | The molecules may explain the water, but they are not what 'water' means [Hale] |
2106 | The only simple things are monads, with no parts or extension [Leibniz] |
2102 | Atomism is irrational because it suggests that two atoms can be indistinguishable [Leibniz] |
2105 | Things are infinitely subdivisible and contain new worlds, which atoms would make impossible [Leibniz] |
20965 | Leibniz upheld conservations of momentum and energy [Leibniz, by Papineau] |
2103 | The idea that the universe could be moved forward with no other change is just a fantasy [Leibniz] |
2100 | Space and time are purely relative [Leibniz] |
2107 | No time exists except instants, and instants are not even a part of time, so time does not exist [Leibniz] |
2101 | If everything in the universe happened a year earlier, there would be no discernible difference [Leibniz] |
22894 | If time were absolute that would make God's existence dependent on it [Leibniz, by Bardon] |
2099 | The existence of God, and all metaphysics, follows from the Principle of Sufficient Reason [Leibniz] |