Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Individuals without Sortals', 'Meditatio de principio individui' and 'Structuralism and the Notion of Dependence'

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25 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
17518 Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope [Ayers]
17516 If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals? [Ayers]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / b. Varieties of structuralism
14085 'Deductivist' structuralism is just theories, with no commitment to objects, or modality [Linnebo]
14084 Non-eliminative structuralism treats mathematical objects as positions in real abstract structures [Linnebo]
14086 'Modal' structuralism studies all possible concrete models for various mathematical theories [Linnebo]
14087 'Set-theoretic' structuralism treats mathematics as various structures realised among the sets [Linnebo]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / d. Platonist structuralism
14089 Structuralism differs from traditional Platonism, because the objects depend ontologically on their structure [Linnebo]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
14083 Structuralism is right about algebra, but wrong about sets [Linnebo]
14090 In mathematical structuralism the small depends on the large, which is the opposite of physical structures [Linnebo]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
17520 Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them [Ayers]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
14091 There may be a one-way direction of dependence among sets, and among natural numbers [Linnebo]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
14088 An 'intrinsic' property is either found in every duplicate, or exists independent of all externals [Linnebo]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
17519 To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
17510 Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers]
17522 We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers]
17515 Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers]
17511 Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
17517 Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
17513 If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
17523 Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
17521 You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers]
17514 Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
17509 Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
17512 If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
12702 Causes can be inferred from perfect knowledge of their effects [Leibniz]