Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Individuals without Sortals', 'Law,Liberty and Morality' and 'Propositions'

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42 ideas

2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
19215 Arguers often turn the opponent's modus ponens into their own modus tollens [Merricks]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
19205 'Snow is white' only contingently expresses the proposition that snow is white [Merricks]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
19209 Simple Quantified Modal Logc doesn't work, because the Converse Barcan is a theorem [Merricks]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
19208 The Converse Barcan implies 'everything exists necessarily' is a consequence of 'necessarily, everything exists' [Merricks]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
19207 Sentence logic maps truth values; predicate logic maps objects and sets [Merricks]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
17518 Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope [Ayers]
17516 If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals? [Ayers]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
17520 Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them [Ayers]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
17519 To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
17510 Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers]
17522 We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers]
17515 Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers]
17511 Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
17517 Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
17513 If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
17523 Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
17521 You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers]
17514 Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
19214 In twinning, one person has the same origin as another person [Merricks]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
17509 Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
17512 If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
19217 I don't accept that if a proposition is directly about an entity, it has a relation to the entity [Merricks]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
19203 A sentence's truth conditions depend on context [Merricks]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
19200 Propositions are standardly treated as possible worlds, or as structured [Merricks]
19206 'Cicero is an orator' represents the same situation as 'Tully is an orator', so they are one proposition [Merricks]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
19202 Propositions are necessary existents which essentially (but inexplicably) represent things [Merricks]
19204 True propositions existed prior to their being thought, and might never be thought [Merricks]
19210 The standard view of propositions says they never change their truth-value [Merricks]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
19201 Propositions can be 'about' an entity, but that doesn't make the entity a constituent of it [Merricks]
19211 Early Russell says a proposition is identical with its truthmaking state of affairs [Merricks]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
19212 Unity of the proposition questions: what unites them? can the same constituents make different ones? [Merricks]
19213 We want to explain not just what unites the constituents, but what unites them into a proposition [Merricks]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
23529 Conduct is not isolated from its effect on the moral code [Hart,HLA]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / e. Democratic minorities
23530 The great danger of democracy is that the oppression of the minority becomes unobjectionable [Hart,HLA]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
23522 In an organised society all actions have some effect on other people [Hart,HLA]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
23528 The value of liberty allows freedom of action, even if that distresses other people [Hart,HLA]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
23523 The principle of legality requires crimes to be precisely defined in advance of any action [Hart,HLA]
23524 Some private moral issues are no concern of the law [Hart,HLA]
23521 Do morals influence law? Is morality an aspect of law? Can law be morally criticised? [Hart,HLA]
23525 Is the enforcement of morality morally justifiable? [Hart,HLA]
23526 Modern law still suppresses practices seen as immoral, and yet harmless [Hart,HLA]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
23527 Moral wickedness of an offence is always relevant to the degree of punishment [Hart,HLA]