84 ideas
| 19767 | Reason leads to prudent selfishness, which overrules natural compassion [Rousseau] |
| 17518 | Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope [Ayers] |
| 17516 | If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals? [Ayers] |
| 17520 | Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them [Ayers] |
| 6504 | For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal [Robinson,H] |
| 6520 | If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features? [Robinson,H] |
| 17519 | To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers] |
| 17510 | Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers] |
| 17522 | We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers] |
| 17515 | Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers] |
| 17511 | Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers] |
| 17517 | Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers] |
| 17513 | If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers] |
| 17523 | Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers] |
| 17521 | You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers] |
| 17514 | Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers] |
| 17509 | Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers] |
| 17512 | If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers] |
| 19757 | No one would bother to reason, and try to know things, without a desire for enjoyment [Rousseau] |
| 6485 | When a red object is viewed, the air in between does not become red [Robinson,H] |
| 6521 | Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world [Robinson,H] |
| 6509 | Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves [Robinson,H] |
| 6522 | Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century) [Robinson,H] |
| 6502 | Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition? [Robinson,H] |
| 6513 | Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking? [Robinson,H] |
| 6512 | Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more [Robinson,H] |
| 6497 | We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them [Robinson,H] |
| 6494 | If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured [Robinson,H] |
| 6499 | Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way [Robinson,H] |
| 6500 | If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities? [Robinson,H] |
| 6484 | Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception [Robinson,H] |
| 6508 | Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism [Robinson,H] |
| 6480 | Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality [Robinson,H] |
| 6482 | For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects [Robinson,H] |
| 6505 | Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism [Robinson,H] |
| 6506 | 'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse [Robinson,H] |
| 6507 | Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects [Robinson,H] |
| 6511 | If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy. [Robinson,H] |
| 6515 | An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained [Robinson,H] |
| 6517 | If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it? [Robinson,H] |
| 6481 | If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties? [Robinson,H] |
| 19760 | General ideas are purely intellectual; imagining them is immediately particular [Rousseau] |
| 19759 | Only words can introduce general ideas into the mind [Rousseau] |
| 6503 | Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything [Robinson,H] |
| 19758 | Language may aid thinking, but powerful thought was needed to produce language [Rousseau] |
| 19773 | Without love, what use is beauty? [Rousseau] |
| 19769 | Rational morality is OK for brainy people, but ordinary life can't rely on that [Rousseau] |
| 19752 | If we should not mistreat humans, it is mainly because of sentience, not rationality [Rousseau] |
| 19768 | The better Golden Rule is 'do good for yourself without harming others' [Rousseau] |
| 19766 | The fact that we weep (e.g. in theatres) shows that we are naturally compassionate [Rousseau] |
| 19756 | Humans are less distinguished from other animals by understanding, than by being free agents [Rousseau] |
| 19755 | Most human ills are self-inflicted; the simple, solitary, regular natural life is good [Rousseau] |
| 19762 | Is language a pre-requisite for society, or might it emerge afterwards? [Rousseau] |
| 19763 | I doubt whether a savage person ever complains of life, or considers suicide [Rousseau] |
| 19765 | Savages avoid evil because they are calm, and never think of it (not because they know goodness) [Rousseau] |
| 19779 | Primitive man was very gentle [Rousseau] |
| 19771 | Savage men quietly pursue desires, without the havoc of modern frenzied imagination [Rousseau] |
| 19778 | Leisure led to envy, inequality, vice and revenge, which we now see in savages [Rousseau] |
| 19751 | Our two starting principles are concern for self-interest, and compassion for others [Rousseau] |
| 19774 | A savage can steal fruit or a home, but there is no means of achieving obedience [Rousseau] |
| 19772 | In a state of nature people are much more equal; it is society which increases inequalities [Rousseau] |
| 19789 | It is against nature for children to rule old men, fools to rule the wise, and the rich to hog resources [Rousseau] |
| 19787 | People accept the right to be commanded, because they themselves wish to command [Rousseau] |
| 19780 | We seem to have made individual progress since savagery, but actually the species has decayed [Rousseau] |
| 19747 | Revolutionaries usually confuse liberty with total freedom, and end up with heavier chains [Rousseau] |
| 19748 | Plebiscites are bad, because they exclude the leaders from crucial decisions [Rousseau] |
| 19749 | In a direct democracy, only the leaders should be able to propose new laws [Rousseau] |
| 19775 | People must be made dependent before they can be enslaved [Rousseau] |
| 19784 | Enslaved peoples often boast of their condition, calling it a state of 'peace' [Rousseau] |
| 19785 | If the child of a slave woman is born a slave, then a man is not born a man [Rousseau] |
| 19746 | Like rich food, liberty can ruin people who are too weak to cope with it [Rousseau] |
| 19786 | Three stages of the state produce inequalities of wealth, power, and enslavement [Rousseau] |
| 19788 | The pleasure of wealth and power is largely seeing others deprived of them [Rousseau] |
| 19777 | Persuading other people that some land was 'owned' was the beginning of society [Rousseau] |
| 19782 | What else could property arise from, but the labour people add to it? [Rousseau] |
| 19781 | Land cultivation led to a general right of ownership, administered justly [Rousseau] |
| 19754 | If we have a natural right to property, what exactly does 'belonging to' mean? [Rousseau] |
| 19750 | Writers just propose natural law as the likely useful agreements among people [Rousseau] |
| 19770 | Primitive people simply redressed the evil caused by violence, without thought of punishing [Rousseau] |
| 19783 | A state of war remains after a conquest, if the losers don't accept the winners [Rousseau] |
| 19753 | Both men and animals are sentient, which should give the latter the right not to be mistreated [Rousseau] |
| 6519 | Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined [Robinson,H] |
| 19761 | Men started with too few particular names, but later had too few natural kind names [Rousseau] |
| 19776 | Small uninterrupted causes can have big effects [Rousseau] |