74 ideas
17518 | Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope [Ayers] |
17516 | If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals? [Ayers] |
17520 | Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them [Ayers] |
6504 | For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal [Robinson,H] |
6520 | If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features? [Robinson,H] |
17519 | To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers] |
17510 | Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers] |
17522 | We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers] |
17515 | Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers] |
17511 | Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers] |
17517 | Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers] |
17513 | If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers] |
17523 | Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers] |
17521 | You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers] |
17514 | Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers] |
17509 | Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers] |
17512 | If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers] |
4266 | Having beliefs involves recognition, expectation and surprise [Scruton] |
4265 | If an animal has beliefs, that implies not only that it can make mistakes, but that it can learn from them [Scruton] |
6485 | When a red object is viewed, the air in between does not become red [Robinson,H] |
6521 | Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world [Robinson,H] |
6509 | Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves [Robinson,H] |
6522 | Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century) [Robinson,H] |
4264 | Perception (which involves an assessment) is a higher state than sensation [Scruton] |
6502 | Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition? [Robinson,H] |
6513 | Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking? [Robinson,H] |
6512 | Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more [Robinson,H] |
6497 | We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them [Robinson,H] |
6494 | If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured [Robinson,H] |
6499 | Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way [Robinson,H] |
6500 | If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities? [Robinson,H] |
6484 | Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception [Robinson,H] |
6508 | Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism [Robinson,H] |
6480 | Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality [Robinson,H] |
6482 | For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects [Robinson,H] |
6505 | Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism [Robinson,H] |
6506 | 'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse [Robinson,H] |
6507 | Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects [Robinson,H] |
6511 | If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy. [Robinson,H] |
6515 | An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained [Robinson,H] |
6517 | If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it? [Robinson,H] |
4271 | There is consciousness whenever behaviour must be explained in terms of mental activity [Scruton] |
6481 | If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties? [Robinson,H] |
4272 | Our concept of a person is derived from Roman law [Scruton] |
4267 | Conditioning may change behaviour without changing the mind [Scruton] |
6503 | Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything [Robinson,H] |
4269 | An emotion is a motive which is also a feeling [Scruton] |
4270 | Do we use reason to distinguish people from animals, or use that difference to define reason? [Scruton] |
4284 | All moral life depends ultimately on piety, which is our recognition of our own dependence [Scruton] |
4273 | Kant's Moral Law is the rules rational beings would accept when trying to live by agreement [Scruton] |
4274 | The modern virtues are courage, prudence, wisdom, temperance, justice, charity and loyalty [Scruton] |
4286 | Only just people will drop their own self-interests when faced with an impartial verdict [Scruton] |
4283 | Sympathy can undermine the moral order just as much as crime does [Scruton] |
4290 | That which can only be done by a callous person, ought not to be done [Scruton] |
4285 | As soon as we drop self-interest and judge impartially, we find ourselves agreeing about conflicts [Scruton] |
4287 | Utilitarianism merely guides us (by means of sympathy) when the moral law is silent [Scruton] |
4282 | Morality is not a sort of calculation, it is what sets the limits to when calculation is appropriate [Scruton] |
4281 | Utilitarianism says we can't blame Stalin yet, but such a theory is a sick joke [Scruton] |
4280 | Utilitarianism is wrong precisely because it can't distinguish animals from people [Scruton] |
4295 | We favour our own animals over foreign ones because we see them as fellow citizens [Scruton] |
4268 | Animals command our sympathy and moral concern initially because of their intentionality [Scruton] |
4291 | Letting your dog kill wild rats, and keeping rats for your dog to kill, are very different [Scruton] |
4263 | Many of the stranger forms of life (e.g. worms) interest us only as a species, not as individuals [Scruton] |
4276 | An animal has individuality if it is nameable, and advanced animals can respond to their name [Scruton] |
4277 | I may avoid stepping on a spider or flower, but fellow-feeling makes me protect a rabbit [Scruton] |
4278 | Lucky animals are eaten by large predators, the less lucky starve, and worst is death by small predators [Scruton] |
4279 | We can easily remove the risk of suffering from an animal's life, but we shouldn't do it [Scruton] |
4289 | Sheep and cattle live comfortable lives, and die an enviably easy death [Scruton] |
4292 | Concern for one animal may harm the species, if the individual is part of a bigger problem [Scruton] |
4294 | Animals are outside the community of rights, but we still have duties towards them [Scruton] |
4296 | Brutal animal sports are banned because they harm the personality of the watcher [Scruton] |
4288 | Many breeds of animals have needs which our own ancestors planted in them [Scruton] |
4293 | Introducing a natural means of controlling animal population may not be very compassionate [Scruton] |
6519 | Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined [Robinson,H] |