Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Individuals without Sortals', 'Essence and Accident' and 'The Raft and the Pyramid'

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27 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
8797 The negation of all my beliefs about my current headache would be fully coherent [Sosa]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
17518 Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope [Ayers]
17516 If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals? [Ayers]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
17520 Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them [Ayers]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
12312 The real essence of a thing is its powers, or 'dispositional properties' [Copi]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
17519 To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
17510 Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers]
17522 We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers]
17515 Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers]
17511 Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
17517 Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
17513 If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
17523 Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
10937 Essential properties are the 'deepest' ones which explain the others [Copi, by Rami]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
12308 In modern science, nominal essence is intended to be real essence [Copi]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
17521 You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers]
17514 Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 11. End of an Object
12303 Within the four types of change, essential attributes are those whose loss means destruction [Copi]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
17509 Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
17512 If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 1. Common Sense
8794 There are very few really obvious truths, and not much can be proved from them [Sosa]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
8796 A single belief can trail two regresses, one terminating and one not [Sosa]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
8799 If mental states are not propositional, they are logically dumb, and cannot be foundations [Sosa]
8795 Mental states cannot be foundational if they are not immune to error [Sosa]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
8798 Vision causes and justifies beliefs; but to some extent the cause is the justification [Sosa]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
12307 Modern science seeks essences, and is getting closer to them [Copi]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
12310 Real essences are scientifically knowable, but so are non-essential properties [Copi]