116 ideas
24084 | Seeing with other eyes is more egoism, but exploring other perspectives leads to objectivity [Nietzsche] |
24092 | I tell the truth, even if it is repulsive [Nietzsche] |
24114 | The pain in truth is when it destroys a belief [Nietzsche] |
24104 | We don't create logic, time and space! The mind obeys laws because they are true [Nietzsche] |
3508 | Correspondence to the facts HAS to be the aim of enquiry [Searle] |
17518 | Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope [Ayers] |
17516 | If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals? [Ayers] |
24112 | To think about being we must have an opinion about what it is [Nietzsche] |
17520 | Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them [Ayers] |
3473 | Reduction can be of things, properties, ideas or causes [Searle] |
3532 | Solidity in a piston is integral to its structure, not supervenient [Maslin on Searle] |
3533 | Is supervenience just causality? [Searle, by Maslin] |
3454 | Reality is entirely particles in force fields [Searle] |
3471 | Some properties depend on components, others on their relations [Searle] |
3472 | Fully 'emergent' properties contradict our whole theory of causation [Searle] |
17519 | To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers] |
17510 | Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers] |
17522 | We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers] |
17515 | Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers] |
17511 | Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers] |
17517 | Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers] |
17513 | If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers] |
24089 | Essences are fictions needed for beings who represent things [Nietzsche] |
17523 | Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers] |
17521 | You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers] |
17514 | Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers] |
17509 | Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers] |
17512 | If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers] |
3491 | Beliefs are part of a network, and also exist against a background [Searle] |
3490 | Beliefs only make sense as part of a network of other beliefs [Searle] |
3482 | Perception is a function of expectation [Searle] |
24115 | There is no proof that we forget things - only that we can't recall [Nietzsche] |
3493 | Memory is mainly a guide for current performance [Searle] |
3463 | We don't have a "theory" that other people have minds [Searle] |
3457 | Other minds are not inferred by analogy, but are our best explanation [Searle] |
24090 | Our inclinations would not conflict if we were a unity; we imagine unity for our multiplicity [Nietzsche] |
3480 | We experience unity at an instant and across time [Searle] |
3479 | The mind experiences space, but it is not experienced as spatial [Searle] |
3470 | Conscious creatures seem able to discriminate better [Searle] |
3486 | Unconscious thoughts are those capable of causing conscious ones [Searle] |
3503 | Consciousness results directly from brain processes, not from some intermediary like information [Searle] |
3465 | Either there is intrinsic intentionality, or everything has it [Searle] |
3484 | Water flowing downhill can be described as if it had intentionality [Searle] |
3489 | Intentional phenomena only make sense within a background [Searle] |
3494 | Intentionality is defined in terms of representation [Searle] |
3481 | Consciousness is essential and basic to intentionality [Searle] |
4088 | Pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself [Searle] |
3467 | Neither introspection nor privileged access makes sense [Searle] |
3483 | Introspection is just thinking about mental states, not a special sort of vision [Searle] |
3468 | I cannot observe my own subjectivity [Searle] |
24099 | We contain many minds, which fight for the 'I' of the mind [Nietzsche] |
3469 | Mind and brain don't interact if they are the same [Searle] |
3487 | Without internal content, a zombie's full behaviour couldn't be explained [Searle] |
3458 | Mental states only relate to behaviour contingently, not necessarily [Searle] |
3485 | Wanting H2O only differs from wanting water in its mental component [Searle] |
3461 | Functionalists like the externalist causal theory of reference [Searle] |
3496 | A program for Chinese translation doesn't need to understand Chinese [Searle] |
3499 | Computation presupposes consciousness [Searle] |
3501 | If we are computers, who is the user? [Searle] |
3456 | Consciousness is a brain property as liquidity is a water property [Searle] |
3455 | Property dualists tend to find the mind-body problem baffling [Searle] |
3475 | Property dualism denies reductionism [Searle] |
3453 | Property dualism is the reappearance of Cartesianism [Searle] |
3477 | If mind-brain supervenience isn't causal, this implies epiphenomenalism [Searle] |
3531 | Mental events can cause even though supervenient, like the solidity of a piston [Searle] |
3476 | Mind and brain are supervenient in respect of cause and effect [Searle] |
3478 | Upwards mental causation makes 'supervenience' irrelevant [Searle] |
3466 | Consciousness seems indefinable by conditions or categories [Searle] |
3500 | Can the homunculus fallacy be beaten by recursive decomposition? [Searle] |
9317 | Searle argues that biology explains consciousness, but physics won't explain biology [Searle, by Kriegel/Williford] |
3474 | If mind is caused by brain, does this mean mind IS brain? [Searle] |
3497 | If mind is multiply realisable, it is possible that anything could realise it [Searle] |
24102 | Thoughts are signs (just as words are) [Nietzsche] |
3462 | We don't postulate folk psychology, we experience it [Searle] |
3498 | Computation isn't a natural phenomenon, it is a way of seeing phenomena [Searle] |
3492 | Content is much more than just sentence meaning [Searle] |
3464 | There is no such thing as 'wide content' [Searle] |
3506 | We explain behaviour in terms of actual internal representations in the agent [Searle] |
3451 | Meaning is derived intentionality [Searle] |
3450 | Philosophy of language is a branch of philosophy of mind [Searle] |
3507 | Universal grammar doesn't help us explain anything [Searle] |
24120 | Great orators lead their arguments, rather than following them [Nietzsche] |
24097 | The pragmatics of language is more comprehensible than the meaning [Nietzsche] |
3495 | Shared Background makes translation possible, though variation makes it hard [Searle] |
24108 | Actions are just a release of force. They seize on something, which becomes the purpose [Nietzsche] |
24105 | Drives make us feel non-feelings; Will is the effect of those feelings [Nietzsche] |
24117 | We need lower and higher drives, but they must be under firm control [Nietzsche] |
24113 | Our motives don't explain our actions [Nietzsche] |
24087 | People who miss beauty seek the sublime, where even the ugly shows its 'beauty' [Nietzsche] |
24091 | The sublimity of nature which dwarfs us was a human creation [Nietzsche] |
24093 | We can aspire to greatness by creating new functions for ourselves [Nietzsche] |
24121 | Greeks might see modern analysis of what is human as impious [Nietzsche] |
24107 | Once a drive controls the intellect, it rules, and sets the goals [Nietzsche] |
24085 | For absolute morality a goal for mankind is needed [Nietzsche] |
24101 | We always assign values, but we may not value those values [Nietzsche] |
3505 | The function of a heart depends on what we want it to do [Searle] |
24094 | Humans are vividly aware of short-term effects, and almost ignorant of the long-term ones [Nietzsche] |
24111 | Happiness is the active equilibrium of our drives [Nietzsche] |
24109 | Actual morality is more complicated and subtle than theory (which gets paralysed) [Nietzsche] |
24110 | Some things we would never do, even for the highest ideals [Nietzsche] |
24103 | You should not want too many virtues; one is enough [Nietzsche] |
24106 | Talk of 'utility' presupposes that what is useful to people has been defined [Nietzsche] |
24086 | The goal is to settle human beings, like other animals, but humans are still changeable [Nietzsche] |
24123 | My eternal recurrence is opposed to feeling fragmented and imperfect [Nietzsche] |
24088 | See our present lives as eternal! Religions see it as fleeting, and aim at some different life [Nietzsche] |
24119 | The eternal return of wastefulness is a terrible thought [Nietzsche] |
24116 | Justice says people are not equal, and should become increasingly unequal [Nietzsche] |
24098 | Reasons that justify punishment can also justify the crime [Nietzsche] |
24118 | Do away with punishment. Counter-retribution is as bad as the crime [Nietzsche] |
24100 | If you don't want war, remove your borders; but you set up borders because you want war [Nietzsche] |
24095 | Our growth is too subtle to perceive, and long events are too slow for us to grasp [Nietzsche] |
3504 | Chemistry entirely explains plant behaviour [Searle] |
24096 | Unlike time, space is subjective. Empty space was assumed, but it doesn't exist [Nietzsche] |
24122 | Life is forces conjoined by nutrition, to produce resistance, arrangement and value [Nietzsche] |
3502 | Mind involves fighting, fleeing, feeding and fornicating [Searle] |
3459 | You can only know the limits of knowledge if you know the other side of the limit [Searle] |