Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Individuals without Sortals', 'On the Pragmatics of Communications' and 'Mirror Mirror - Is That All?'

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24 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Organisms understand their worlds better if they understand themselves [Gulick]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope [Ayers]
If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals? [Ayers]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them [Ayers]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers]
We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers]
Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers]
Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers]
Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
In contrast with knowledge, the notion of understanding emphasizes practical engagement [Gulick]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 6. Knowing How
Knowing-that is a much richer kind of knowing-how [Gulick]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
Is consciousness a type of self-awareness, or is being self-aware a way of being conscious? [Gulick]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
Higher-order theories divide over whether the higher level involves thought or perception [Gulick]
Higher-order models reduce the problem of consciousness to intentionality [Gulick]
Maybe qualia only exist at the lower level, and a higher-level is needed for what-it-is-like [Gulick]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
To understand language is to know how to use it to reach shared understandings [Habermas]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
From the teleopragmatic perspective, life is largely an informational process [Gulick]