Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Individuals without Sortals', 'The Blue and Brown Notebooks' and 'The Theory of Logical Types'

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22 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
21566 'Propositional functions' are ambiguous until the variable is given a value [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
21567 'All judgements made by Epimenedes are true' needs the judgements to be of the same type [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
17518 Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope [Ayers]
17516 If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals? [Ayers]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
23457 Type theory cannot identify features across levels (because such predicates break the rules) [Morris,M on Russell]
21556 Classes are defined by propositional functions, and functions are typed, with an axiom of reducibility [Russell, by Lackey]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / d. Predicativism
21568 A one-variable function is only 'predicative' if it is one order above its arguments [Russell]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
17520 Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them [Ayers]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
17519 To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
17510 Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers]
17522 We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers]
17515 Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers]
17511 Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
17517 Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
17513 If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
17523 Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
17521 You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers]
17514 Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
17509 Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
17512 If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 3. Reference of 'I'
22419 'I' is a subject in 'I am in pain' and an object in 'I am bleeding' [Wittgenstein, by McGinn]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
6318 The doctrine of indeterminacy of translation seems implied by the later Wittgenstein [Wittgenstein, by Quine]