Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Individuals without Sortals', 'Philosophical Grammar' and 'Critique of Judgement I: Aesthetic'

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30 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
18281 In mathematics everything is algorithm and nothing is meaning [Wittgenstein]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
17518 Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope [Ayers]
17516 If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals? [Ayers]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
17520 Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them [Ayers]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
17519 To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
17510 Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers]
17522 We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers]
17515 Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers]
17511 Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
17517 Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
17513 If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
17523 Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
17521 You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers]
17514 Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
17509 Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
17512 If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 1. Aesthetics
12157 Kant gave form and status to aesthetics, and Hegel gave it content [Kant, by Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
20346 The aesthetic attitude is a matter of disinterestedness [Kant, by Wollheim]
18547 Only rational beings can experience beauty [Kant, by Scruton]
6606 Consider: "Imagine this butterfly exactly as it is, but ugly instead of beautiful" [Wittgenstein]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
20408 With respect to the senses, taste is an entirely personal matter [Kant]
20409 When we judge beauty, it isn't just personal; we judge on behalf of everybody [Kant]
20411 Saying everyone has their own taste destroys the very idea of taste [Kant]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
22711 The beautiful is not conceptualised as moral, but it symbolises or resembles goodness [Kant, by Murdoch]
4025 Kant saw beauty as a sort of disinterested pleasure, which has become separate from the good [Kant, by Taylor,C]
20412 Beauty is only judged in pure contemplation, and not with something else at stake [Kant]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 6. The Sublime
22046 The mathematical sublime is immeasurable greatness; the dynamical sublime is overpowering [Kant, by Pinkard]
21458 The sublime is a moral experience [Kant, by Gardner]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 5. Objectivism in Art
5643 Aesthetic values are not objectively valid, but we must treat them as if they are [Kant, by Scruton]
20410 The judgement of beauty is not cognitive, but relates, via imagination, to pleasurable feelings [Kant]