Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Individuals without Sortals', 'The Blue and Brown Notebooks' and 'Epistemology Naturalized'

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25 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
17518 Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope [Ayers]
17516 If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals? [Ayers]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
1635 Mathematics reduces to set theory (which is a bit vague and unobvious), but not to logic proper [Quine]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
17520 Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them [Ayers]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
17519 To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
17510 Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers]
17522 We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers]
17515 Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers]
17511 Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
17517 Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
17513 If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
17523 Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
17521 You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers]
17514 Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
17509 Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
17512 If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 9. Naturalised Epistemology
7627 You can't reduce epistemology to psychology, because that presupposes epistemology [Maund on Quine]
8871 We should abandon a search for justification or foundations, and focus on how knowledge is acquired [Quine, by Davidson]
8826 If we abandon justification and normativity in epistemology, we must also abandon knowledge [Kim on Quine]
8827 Without normativity, naturalized epistemology isn't even about beliefs [Kim on Quine]
8899 Epistemology is a part of psychology, studying how our theories relate to our evidence [Quine]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 3. Reference of 'I'
22419 'I' is a subject in 'I am in pain' and an object in 'I am bleeding' [Wittgenstein, by McGinn]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
8898 Inculcations of meanings of words rests ultimately on sensory evidence [Quine]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
8900 In observation sentences, we could substitute community acceptance for analyticity [Quine]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
6318 The doctrine of indeterminacy of translation seems implied by the later Wittgenstein [Wittgenstein, by Quine]