Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Individuals without Sortals', 'works' and 'Causation and Laws of Nature'

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25 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 3. Analysis of Preconditions
14600 Analysis aims at secure necessary and sufficient conditions [Schaffer,J]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
14603 'Reification' occurs if we mistake a concept for a thing [Schaffer,J]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / d. System T
14607 T adds □p→p for reflexivity, and is ideal for modeling lawhood [Schaffer,J]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
7334 Anti-realism needs an intuitionist logic with no law of excluded middle [Dummett, by Miller,A]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
17518 Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope [Ayers]
17516 If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals? [Ayers]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
14604 If a notion is ontologically basic, it should be needed in our best attempt at science [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
17520 Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them [Ayers]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
14599 Three types of reduction: Theoretical (of terms), Definitional (of concepts), Ontological (of reality) [Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
3303 For anti-realists there are no natural distinctions between objects [Dummett, by Benardete,JA]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
14605 Tropes are the same as events [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
17519 To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers]
14601 Individuation aims to count entities, by saying when there is one [Schaffer,J]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
17510 Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers]
17522 We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers]
17515 Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers]
17511 Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
17517 Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
17513 If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
17523 Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
17521 You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers]
17514 Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
17509 Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
17512 If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
14606 Only ideal conceivability could indicate what is possible [Schaffer,J]