41 ideas
17651 | Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman] |
14001 | People who use science to make philosophical points don't realise how philosophical science is [Markosian] |
17652 | Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved [Goodman] |
13991 | Presentism has the problem that if Socrates ceases to exist, so do propositions about him [Markosian] |
17518 | Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope [Ayers] |
17516 | If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals? [Ayers] |
17520 | Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them [Ayers] |
17656 | Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman] |
17661 | We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman] |
17659 | Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman] |
17657 | We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman] |
17654 | A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman] |
17519 | To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers] |
17510 | Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers] |
17522 | We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers] |
17515 | Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers] |
17511 | Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers] |
17517 | Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers] |
17513 | If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers] |
17523 | Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers] |
17521 | You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers] |
17514 | Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers] |
17509 | Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers] |
17653 | Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman] |
17512 | If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers] |
14002 | Possible worlds must be abstract, because two qualitatively identical worlds are just one world [Markosian] |
17660 | Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman] |
17658 | Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman] |
17650 | We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman] |
17655 | Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman] |
14000 | 'Grabby' truth conditions first select their object, unlike 'searchy' truth conditions [Markosian] |
17649 | If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one [Goodman] |
13990 | Presentism is the view that only present objects exist [Markosian] |
13992 | Presentism says if objects don't exist now, we can't have attitudes to them or relations with them [Markosian] |
13994 | Presentism seems to entail that we cannot talk about other times [Markosian] |
13995 | Serious Presentism says things must exist to have relations and properties; Unrestricted version denies this [Markosian] |
13996 | Maybe Presentists can refer to the haecceity of a thing, after the thing itself disappears [Markosian] |
13997 | Maybe Presentists can paraphrase singular propositions about the past [Markosian] |
13993 | Special Relativity denies the absolute present which Presentism needs [Markosian] |
13998 | Objects in the past, like Socrates, are more like imaginary objects than like remote spatial objects [Markosian] |
13999 | People are mistaken when they think 'Socrates was a philosopher' says something [Markosian] |