Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Individuals without Sortals', 'Timaeus' and 'Things and Their Parts'

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49 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
For relaxation one can consider the world of change, instead of eternal things [Plato]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
Philosophy is the supreme gift of the gods to mortals [Plato]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Nothing can come to be without a cause [Plato]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Part and whole contribute asymmetrically to one another, so must differ [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope [Ayers]
If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals? [Ayers]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / c. Becoming
Before the existence of the world there must have been being, space and becoming [Plato]
The apprehensions of reason remain unchanging, but reasonless sensation shows mere becoming [Plato]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them [Ayers]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
Plato's Forms were seen as part of physics, rather than of metaphysics [Plato, by Annas]
Something will always be well-made if the maker keeps in mind the eternal underlying pattern [Plato]
In addition to the underlying unchanging model and a changing copy of it, there must also be a foundation of all change [Plato]
For knowledge and true opinion to be different there must be Forms; otherwise we are just stuck with sensations [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
The universe is basically an intelligible and unchanging model, and a visible and changing copy of it [Plato]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers]
We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers]
Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers]
Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
Hierarchical set membership models objects better than the subset or aggregate relations do [Fine,K]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
The matter is a relatively unstructured version of the object, like a set without membership structure [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
A 'temporary' part is a part at one time, but may not be at another, like a carburetor [Fine,K]
A 'timeless' part just is a part, not a part at some time; some atoms are timeless parts of a water molecule [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
An 'aggregative' sum is spread in time, and exists whenever a component exists [Fine,K]
An 'compound' sum is not spread in time, and only exists when all the components exists [Fine,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Two sorts of whole have 'rigid embodiment' (timeless parts) or 'variable embodiment' (temporary parts) [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers]
Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Only bird-brained people think astronomy is entirely a matter of evidence [Plato]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
Plato says the soul is ordered by number [Plato, by Plutarch]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
No one wants to be bad, but bad men result from physical and educational failures, which they do not want or choose [Plato]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / a. Music
Music has harmony like the soul, and serves to reorder disharmony within us [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
One should exercise both the mind and the body, to avoid imbalance [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
Everything that takes place naturally is pleasant [Plato]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
Intelligence is the result of rational teaching; true opinion can result from irrational persuasion [Plato]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Bad governments prevent discussion, and discourage the study of virtue [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
The creator of the cosmos had no envy, and so wanted things to be as like himself as possible [Plato]
The cosmos must be unique, because it resembles the creator, who is unique [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
We must consider the four basic shapes as too small to see, only becoming visible in large numbers [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
There are two types of cause, the necessary and the divine [Plato]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
Heavenly movements gave us the idea of time, and caused us to inquire about the heavens [Plato]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / a. Beginning of time
Time came into existence with the heavens, so that there will be a time when they can be dissolved [Plato]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
Clearly the world is good, so its maker must have been concerned with the eternal, not with change [Plato]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 3. The Beginning
If the cosmos is an object of perception then it must be continually changing [Plato]