Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Individuals without Sortals', 'Theory of Knowledge (2nd ed 1977)' and 'On Nature Itself (De Ipsa Natura)'

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24 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
17518 Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope [Ayers]
17516 If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals? [Ayers]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
17520 Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them [Ayers]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
17519 To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
17510 Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers]
17522 We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers]
17515 Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers]
17511 Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
17517 Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
12756 Substance is a force for acting and being acted upon [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
17513 If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
17523 Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
17521 You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers]
17514 Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
17509 Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
17512 If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
19569 We have a basic epistemic duty to believe truth and avoid error [Chisholm, by Kvanvig]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / h. Explanations by function
12755 Final causes can help with explanations in physics [Leibniz]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
12760 Something rather like souls (though not intelligent) could be found everywhere [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
12759 There are atoms of substance, but no atoms of bulk or extension [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / a. Early Modern matter
12718 Secondary matter is active and complete; primary matter is passive and incomplete [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
11854 If there is some trace of God in things, that would explain their natural force [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
12758 It is plausible to think substances contain the same immanent force seen in our free will [Leibniz]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 2. Pantheism
19408 To say that nature or the one universal substance is God is a pernicious doctrine [Leibniz]