Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Individuals without Sortals', 'Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn)' and 'From Metaphysics to Ethics'

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71 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Serious metaphysics cares about entailment between sentences [Jackson]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Conceptual analysis studies whether one story is made true by another story [Jackson]
Intuitions about possibilities are basic to conceptual analysis [Jackson]
Conceptual analysis is needed to establish that metaphysical reductions respect original meanings [Jackson, by Schroeter]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
Something can only have a place in a preferred account of things if it is entailed by the account [Jackson]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
Truth supervenes on being [Jackson]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope [Ayers]
If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals? [Ayers]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them [Ayers]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Smooth reductions preserve high-level laws in the lower level [Jackson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
Baldness is just hair distribution, but the former is indeterminate, unlike the latter [Jackson]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Redness is a property, but only as a presentation to normal humans [Jackson]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers]
We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers]
Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers]
Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers]
Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
We should not multiply senses of necessity beyond necessity [Jackson]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Mathematical sentences are a problem in a possible-worlds framework [Jackson]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Possible worlds could be concrete, abstract, universals, sentences, or properties [Jackson]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
Long arithmetic calculations show the a priori can be fallible [Jackson]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / a. Qualities in perception
We examine objects to determine colour; we do not introspect [Jackson]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
The 'Kantian' self steps back from commitment to its social situation [Kymlicka]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
In physicalism, the psychological depends on the physical, not the other way around [Jackson]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Is the dependence of the psychological on the physical a priori or a posteriori? [Jackson]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
If different states can fulfil the same role, the converse must also be possible [Jackson]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Folk psychology covers input, internal role, and output [Jackson]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Egocentric or de se content seems to be irreducibly so [Jackson]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
Keep distinct the essential properties of water, and application conditions for the word 'water' [Jackson]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / c. Classical concepts
Analysis is finding necessary and sufficient conditions by studying possible cases [Jackson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Successful predication supervenes on nature [Jackson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
I can understand "He has a beard", without identifying 'he', and hence the truth conditions [Jackson]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
Folk morality does not clearly distinguish between doing and allowing [Jackson]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Moral functionalism says moral terms get their meaning from their role in folk morality [Jackson]
Which are prior - thin concepts like right, good, ought; or thick concepts like kindness, equity etc.? [Jackson]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
Teleological theories give the good priority over concern for people [Kymlicka]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
Maybe the particularist moral thought of women is better than the impartial public thinking of men [Kymlicka]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism is not a decision-procedure; choice of the best procedure is an open question [Kymlicka]
One view says start with equality, and infer equal weight to interests, and hence maximum utility [Kymlicka]
A second view says start with maximising the good, implying aggregation, and hence equality [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 2. Population / a. Human population
To maximise utility should we double the population, even if life somewhat deteriorates? [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / c. Difference principle
The difference principles says we must subsidise the costs of other people's choices [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
Social contract theories are usually rejected because there never was such a contract [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 4. Social Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism is no longer a distinctive political position [Kymlicka]
The quest of the general good is partly undermined by people's past entitlements [Kymlicka]
We shouldn't endorse preferences which reject equality, and show prejudice and selfishness [Kymlicka]
Using utilitarian principles to make decisions encourages cold detachment from people [Kymlicka]
Utilitarianism is irrational if it tells you to trade in your rights and resources just for benefits [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
Modern liberalism has added personal privacy to our personal social lives [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
Liberalism tends to give priority to basic liberties [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
Marxists say liberalism is unjust, because it allows exploitation in the sale of labour [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
The 'Kantian' view of the self misses the way it is embedded or situated in society [Kymlicka]
Communitarians say we should pay more attention to our history [Kymlicka]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / b. Against communitarianism
Communitarian states only encourage fairly orthodox ideas of the good life [Kymlicka]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
If everyone owned himself, that would prevent slavery [Kymlicka]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 4. Free market
Libertarians like the free market, but they also think that the free market is just [Kymlicka]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
The most valuable liberties to us need not be the ones with the most freedom [Kymlicka]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 6. Political freedom
Ancient freedom was free participation in politics, not private independence of life [Kymlicka]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
Equal opportunities seems fair, because your fate is from your choices, not your circumstances [Kymlicka]
Equal opportunity arbitrarily worries about social circumstances, but ignores talents [Kymlicka]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 3. Legal equality
Marxists say justice is unneeded in the truly good community [Kymlicka]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
The Lockean view of freedom depends on whether you had a right to what is restricted [Kymlicka]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
Justice corrects social faults, but also expresses respect to individuals as ends [Kymlicka]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
It is hard to justify the huge difference in our judgements of abortion and infanticide [Jackson]