Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Individuals without Sortals', 'Truth by Convention' and 'Grundlagen (Foundations of Theory of Manifolds)'

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27 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
8996 If if time is money then if time is not money then time is money then if if if time is not money... [Quine]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
8995 Definition by words is determinate but relative; fixing contexts could make it absolute [Quine]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
15946 Cantor developed sets from a progression into infinity by addition, multiplication and exponentiation [Cantor, by Lavine]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
10064 Quine quickly dismisses If-thenism [Quine, by Musgrave]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention
20296 Logic needs general conventions, but that needs logic to apply them to individual cases [Quine, by Rey]
8998 Claims that logic and mathematics are conventional are either empty, uninteresting, or false [Quine]
8999 Logic isn't conventional, because logic is needed to infer logic from conventions [Quine]
9000 If a convention cannot be communicated until after its adoption, what is its role? [Quine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
8994 If analytic geometry identifies figures with arithmetical relations, logicism can include geometry [Quine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
15911 Ordinals are generated by endless succession, followed by a limit ordinal [Cantor, by Lavine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
17518 Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope [Ayers]
17516 If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals? [Ayers]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
8997 There are four different possible conventional accounts of geometry [Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
8993 If mathematics follows from definitions, then it is conventional, and part of logic [Quine]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
17520 Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them [Ayers]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
17519 To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
17510 Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers]
17522 We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers]
17515 Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers]
17511 Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
17517 Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
17513 If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
17523 Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
17521 You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers]
17514 Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
17509 Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
17512 If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers]