Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Individuals without Sortals', 'Existence and Quantification' and 'talk'

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45 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
Quine says quantified modal logic creates nonsense, bad ontology, and false essentialism [Melia on Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Various strategies try to deal with the ontological commitments of second-order logic [Hale/Wright on Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
F(x) walked into a bar. The barman said.. [Sommers,W]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope [Ayers]
If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals? [Ayers]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / b. Being and existence
Philosophers tend to distinguish broad 'being' from narrower 'existence' - but I reject that [Quine]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
Sartre to Waitress: Coffee with no cream, please... [Sommers,W]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
All we have of general existence is what existential quantifiers express [Quine]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them [Ayers]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Said Plato: 'The things that we feel... [Sommers,W]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
Existence is implied by the quantifiers, not by the constants [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / c. Commitment of predicates
Theories are committed to objects of which some of its predicates must be true [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
Express a theory in first-order predicate logic; its ontology is the types of bound variable needed for truth [Quine, by Lowe]
Ontological commitment of theories only arise if they are classically quantified [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
You can be implicitly committed to something without quantifying over it [Thomasson on Quine]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
In formal terms, a category is the range of some style of variables [Quine]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers]
We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers]
Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers]
Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers]
Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
Barman to Descartes: Would you like another drink?... [Sommers,W]
There was a young student called Fred... [Sommers,W]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
A philosopher and his wife are out for a drive... [Sommers,W]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / c. Empirical idealism
Dear Sir, Your astonishment's odd.... [Sommers,W]
There once was a man who said: 'God... [Sommers,W]
..But if he's a student of Berkeley... [Sommers,W]
The philosopher Berkeley once said.. [Sommers,W]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
"My dog's got synaesthesia." How does he smell? ..... [Sommers,W]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
A toper who spies in the distance... [Sommers,W]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
There once was a man who said 'Damn!... [Sommers,W]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
How do behaviourists greet each other? [Sommers,W]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
'If you're aristocratic,' said Nietzsche... [Sommers,W]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 2. Anarchism
Why do anarchists drink herbal tea? [Sommers,W]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
Cries the maid: 'You must marry me Hume!'... [Sommers,W]
Causation - we all thought we knew it/ Till Hume came along and saw through it/…. [Sommers,W]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / c. Idealist time
The barman called 'Time!', and Augustine said..... [Sommers,W]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / c. Tenses and time
The past, present and future walked into a bar.... [Sommers,W]