Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Thinking About Mechanisms', 'On 'Generation and Corruption'' and 'The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism'

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39 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
12667 Metaphysics aims at the simplest explanation, without regard to testability [Ellis]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
12666 We can base logic on acceptability, and abandon the Fregean account by truth-preservation [Ellis]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
12688 Mathematics is the formal study of the categorical dimensions of things [Ellis]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
12683 Objects and substances are a subcategory of the natural kinds of processes [Ellis]
16554 Activities have place, rate, duration, entities, properties, modes, direction, polarity, energy and range [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
12670 A physical event is any change of distribution of energy [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
12673 Physical properties are those relevant to how a physical system might act [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
12665 I support categorical properties, although most people only want causal powers [Ellis]
12682 Essentialism needs categorical properties (spatiotemporal and numerical relations) and dispositions [Ellis]
12684 Spatial, temporal and numerical relations have causal roles, without being causal [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
12672 Properties and relations are discovered, so they can't be mere sets of individuals [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
16556 Penicillin causes nothing; the cause is what penicillin does [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
12676 Causal powers can't rest on things which lack causal power [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
23781 Categoricals exist to influence powers. Such as structures, orientations and magnitudes [Ellis, by Williams,NE]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
12686 Causal powers are a proper subset of the dispositional properties [Ellis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
12685 Categorical properties depend only on the structures they represent [Ellis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
12679 A real essence is a kind's distinctive properties [Ellis]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
12668 Metaphysical necessity holds between things in the world and things they make true [Ellis]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
12687 Metaphysical necessities are those depending on the essential nature of things [Ellis]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
16562 We understand something by presenting its low-level entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
12669 Science aims to explain things, not just describe them [Ellis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
16563 The explanation is not the regularity, but the activity sustaining it [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / h. Explanations by function
16555 Functions are not properties of objects, they are activities contributing to mechanisms [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
16529 Mechanisms are systems organised to produce regular change [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
16530 A mechanism explains a phenomenon by showing how it was produced [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
16553 Our account of mechanism combines both entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
16559 Descriptions of explanatory mechanisms have a bottom level, where going further is irrelevant [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
16528 Mechanisms are not just push-pull systems [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
16564 There are four types of bottom-level activities which will explain phenomena [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
16561 We can abstract by taking an exemplary case and ignoring the detail [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
16570 Elements are found last in dismantling bodies, and first in generating them [Albert of Saxony]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
12681 There are natural kinds of processes [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
12680 Natural kind structures go right down to the bottom level [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
12675 Laws of nature are just descriptions of how things are disposed to behave [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
16558 Laws of nature have very little application in biology [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
12671 I deny forces as entities that intervene in causation, but are not themselves causal [Ellis]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / a. Energy
12674 Energy is the key multi-valued property, vital to scientific realism [Ellis]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
12689 Simultaneity can be temporal equidistance from the Big Bang [Ellis]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
12690 The present is the collapse of the light wavefront from the Big Bang [Ellis]