Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Thinking About Mechanisms', 'Freedom and Reason' and 'Letters to Queen Charlotte'

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21 ideas

6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
We know mathematical axioms, such as subtracting equals from equals leaves equals, by a natural light [Leibniz]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
Activities have place, rate, duration, entities, properties, modes, direction, polarity, energy and range [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Penicillin causes nothing; the cause is what penicillin does [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
A necessary feature (such as air for humans) is not therefore part of the essence [Leibniz]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Intelligible truth is independent of any external things or experiences [Leibniz]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
We understand something by presenting its low-level entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
We know objects by perceptions, but their qualities don't reveal what it is we are perceiving [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
There is nothing in the understanding but experiences, plus the understanding itself, and the understander [Leibniz]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
The explanation is not the regularity, but the activity sustaining it [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / h. Explanations by function
Functions are not properties of objects, they are activities contributing to mechanisms [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
Mechanisms are systems organised to produce regular change [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
A mechanism explains a phenomenon by showing how it was produced [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
Our account of mechanism combines both entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
Descriptions of explanatory mechanisms have a bottom level, where going further is irrelevant [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
Mechanisms are not just push-pull systems [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
There are four types of bottom-level activities which will explain phenomena [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
We can abstract by taking an exemplary case and ignoring the detail [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
Moral statements are imperatives rather than the avowals of emotion - but universalisable [Hare, by Glock]
Universalised prescriptivism could be seen as implying utilitarianism [Hare, by Foot]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
The categorical imperative leads to utilitarianism [Hare, by Nagel]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
Laws of nature have very little application in biology [Machamer/Darden/Craver]