129 ideas
| 20678 | The Scientific Revolution was the discovery of our own ignorance [Harari] |
| 20686 | For millenia people didn't know how to convert one type of energy into another [Harari] |
| 5361 | Philosophers must get used to absurdities [Russell] |
| 5368 | Philosophy verifies that our hierarchy of instinctive beliefs is harmonious and consistent [Russell] |
| 5432 | Metaphysics cannot give knowledge of the universe as a whole [Russell] |
| 5434 | Philosophy is similar to science, and has no special source of wisdom [Russell] |
| 5405 | The law of contradiction is not a 'law of thought', but a belief about things [Russell] |
| 5396 | Three Laws of Thought: identity, contradiction, and excluded middle [Russell] |
| 5420 | Truth is a property of a belief, but dependent on its external relations, not its internal qualities [Russell] |
| 5419 | Truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs and statements [Russell] |
| 5417 | A good theory of truth must make falsehood possible [Russell] |
| 7395 | Truth as congruence may work for complex beliefs, but not for simple beliefs about existence [Joslin on Russell] |
| 5428 | Beliefs are true if they have corresponding facts, and false if they don't [Russell] |
| 5421 | The coherence theory says falsehood is failure to cohere, and truth is fitting into a complete system of Truth [Russell] |
| 5422 | More than one coherent body of beliefs seems possible [Russell] |
| 5423 | If we suspend the law of contradiction, nothing will appear to be incoherent [Russell] |
| 5424 | Coherence is not the meaning of truth, but an important test for truth [Russell] |
| 5401 | The mortality of Socrates is more certain from induction than it is from deduction [Russell] |
| 5395 | Demonstration always relies on the rule that anything implied by a truth is true [Russell] |
| 5386 | Proper names are really descriptions, and can be replaced by a description in a person's mind [Russell] |
| 5385 | The phrase 'a so-and-so' is an 'ambiguous' description'; 'the so-and-so' (singular) is a 'definite' description [Russell] |
| 5399 | Maths is not known by induction, because further instances are not needed to support it [Russell] |
| 16554 | Activities have place, rate, duration, entities, properties, modes, direction, polarity, energy and range [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 5370 | Space is neutral between touch and sight, so it cannot really be either of them [Russell] |
| 5418 | In a world of mere matter there might be 'facts', but no truths [Russell] |
| 5371 | Because we depend on correspondence, we know relations better than we know the items that relate [Russell] |
| 5407 | That Edinburgh is north of London is a non-mental fact, so relations are independent universals [Russell] |
| 16556 | Penicillin causes nothing; the cause is what penicillin does [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 5383 | Every complete sentence must contain at least one word (a verb) which stands for a universal [Russell] |
| 4428 | Propositions express relations (prepositions and verbs) as well as properties (nouns and adjectives) [Russell] |
| 5406 | Confused views of reality result from thinking that only nouns and adjectives represent universals [Russell] |
| 4479 | All universals are like the relation "is north of", in having no physical location at all [Russell, by Loux] |
| 4030 | Russell claims that universals are needed to explain a priori knowledge (as their relations) [Russell, by Mellor/Oliver] |
| 4427 | Every sentence contains at least one word denoting a universal, so we need universals to know truth [Russell] |
| 5409 | Normal existence is in time, so we must say that universals 'subsist' [Russell] |
| 5408 | If we identify whiteness with a thought, we can never think of it twice; whiteness is the object of a thought [Russell] |
| 4441 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' won't work, because the theory treats resemblance itself as a universal [Russell] |
| 4429 | If we consider whiteness to be merely a mental 'idea', we rob it of its universality [Russell] |
| 5400 | In any possible world we feel that two and two would be four [Russell] |
| 5431 | Knowledge cannot be precisely defined, as it merges into 'probable opinion' [Russell] |
| 16562 | We understand something by presenting its low-level entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 5426 | Belief relates a mind to several things other than itself [Russell] |
| 5366 | We have an 'instinctive' belief in the external world, prior to all reflection [Russell] |
| 5359 | Descartes showed that subjective things are the most certain [Russell] |
| 5377 | 'Acquaintance' is direct awareness, without inferences or judgements [Russell] |
| 6510 | Russell (1912) said phenomena only resemble reality in abstract structure [Russell, by Robinson,H] |
| 5372 | There is no reason to think that objects have colours [Russell] |
| 5373 | 'Idealism' says that everything which exists is in some sense mental [Russell] |
| 5362 | It is not illogical to think that only myself and my mental events exist [Russell] |
| 5412 | Some propositions are self-evident, but their implications may also be self-evident [Russell] |
| 5413 | Particular instances are more clearly self-evident than any general principles [Russell] |
| 5415 | As shown by memory, self-evidence comes in degrees [Russell] |
| 5416 | If self-evidence has degrees, we should accept the more self-evident as correct [Russell] |
| 5397 | The rationalists were right, because we know logical principles without experience [Russell] |
| 4430 | All a priori knowledge deals with the relations of universals [Russell] |
| 5411 | We can know some general propositions by universals, when no instance can be given [Russell] |
| 6514 | Russell's representationalism says primary qualities only show the structure of reality [Russell, by Robinson,H] |
| 6415 | After 1912, Russell said sense-data are last in analysis, not first in experience [Russell, by Grayling] |
| 5358 | 'Sense-data' are what are immediately known in sensation, such as colours or roughnesses [Russell] |
| 7290 | If Russell rejects innate ideas and direct a priori knowledge, he is left with a tabula rasa [Russell, by Thompson] |
| 5357 | It is natural to begin from experience, and presumably that is the basis of knowledge [Russell] |
| 5382 | We are acquainted with outer and inner sensation, memory, Self, and universals [Russell, by PG] |
| 5389 | Knowledge by descriptions enables us to transcend private experience [Russell] |
| 5376 | I can know the existence of something with which nobody is acquainted [Russell] |
| 5414 | Images are not memory, because they are present, and memories are of the past [Russell] |
| 5430 | A true belief is not knowledge if it is reached by bad reasoning [Russell] |
| 5429 | True belief is not knowledge when it is deduced from false belief [Russell] |
| 5378 | All knowledge (of things and of truths) rests on the foundations of acquaintance [Russell] |
| 5365 | Dreams can be explained fairly scientifically if we assume a physical world [Russell] |
| 5391 | Science aims to find uniformities to which (within the limits of experience) there are no exceptions [Russell] |
| 5390 | Chickens are not very good at induction, and are surprised when their feeder wrings their neck [Russell] |
| 5394 | We can't prove induction from experience without begging the question [Russell] |
| 5392 | It doesn't follow that because the future has always resembled the past, that it always will [Russell] |
| 16563 | The explanation is not the regularity, but the activity sustaining it [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 16555 | Functions are not properties of objects, they are activities contributing to mechanisms [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 16529 | Mechanisms are systems organised to produce regular change [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 16530 | A mechanism explains a phenomenon by showing how it was produced [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 16553 | Our account of mechanism combines both entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 16559 | Descriptions of explanatory mechanisms have a bottom level, where going further is irrelevant [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 16528 | Mechanisms are not just push-pull systems [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 5363 | If the cat reappears in a new position, presumably it has passed through the intermediate positions [Russell] |
| 5367 | Belief in real objects makes our account of experience simpler and more systematic [Russell] |
| 16564 | There are four types of bottom-level activities which will explain phenomena [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 5364 | It is hard not to believe that speaking humans are expressing thoughts, just as we do ourselves [Russell] |
| 5379 | If we didn't know our own minds by introspection, we couldn't know that other people have minds [Russell] |
| 16561 | We can abstract by taking an exemplary case and ignoring the detail [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 5410 | I learn the universal 'resemblance' by seeing two shades of green, and their contrast with red [Russell] |
| 5381 | In seeing the sun, we are acquainted with our self, but not as a permanent person [Russell] |
| 5380 | In perceiving the sun, I am aware of sun sense-data, and of the perceiver of the data [Russell] |
| 5369 | It is rational to believe in reality, despite the lack of demonstrative reasons for it [Russell] |
| 5375 | Knowledge of truths applies to judgements; knowledge by acquaintance applies to sensations and things [Russell] |
| 21711 | Russell's 'multiple relations' theory says beliefs attach to ingredients, not to propositions [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
| 5427 | Truth is when a mental state corresponds to a complex unity of external constituents [Russell] |
| 5425 | In order to explain falsehood, a belief must involve several terms, not two [Russell] |
| 5384 | A universal of which we are aware is called a 'concept' [Russell] |
| 13468 | Russell started philosophy of language, by declaring some plausible sentences to be meaningless [Russell, by Hart,WD] |
| 5388 | Every understood proposition is composed of constituents with which we are acquainted [Russell] |
| 5387 | It is pure chance which descriptions in a person's mind make a name apply to an individual [Russell] |
| 21724 | The main aim of the multiple relations theory of judgement was to dispense with propositions [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
| 20692 | Money does produce happiness, but only up to a point [Harari] |
| 5398 | Judgements of usefulness depend on judgements of value [Russell] |
| 20663 | If a group is bound by gossip, the natural size is 150 people [Harari] |
| 20677 | Since 1500 human population has increased fourteenfold, and consumption far more [Harari] |
| 20688 | People 300m tons; domesticated animals 700m tons; larger wild animals 100m tons [Harari] |
| 20674 | The Nazi aim was to encourage progressive evolution, and avoid degeneration [Harari] |
| 20679 | We stabilise societies with dogmas, either of dubious science, or of non-scientific values [Harari] |
| 20690 | The state fostered individualism, to break the power of family and community [Harari] |
| 20689 | In 1750 losing your family and community meant death [Harari] |
| 20681 | The sacred command of capitalism is that profits must be used to increase production [Harari] |
| 20682 | The main rule of capitalism is that all other goods depend on economic growth [Harari] |
| 20683 | The progress of capitalism depends entirely on the new discoveries and gadgets of science [Harari] |
| 20687 | In capitalism the rich invest, and the rest of us go shopping [Harari] |
| 20685 | No market is free of political bias, and markets need protection of their freedoms [Harari] |
| 20693 | Freedom may work against us, as individuals can choose to leave, and make fewer commitments [Harari] |
| 20691 | Real peace is the implausibility of war (and not just its absence) [Harari] |
| 20684 | Financing is increasingly through credit rather than taxes; people prefer investing to taxation [Harari] |
| 20675 | The more you know about history, the harder it becomes to explain [Harari] |
| 20676 | History teaches us that the present was not inevitable, and shows us the possibilities [Harari] |
| 5393 | We can't know that our laws are exceptionless, or even that there are any laws [Russell] |
| 16558 | Laws of nature have very little application in biology [Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
| 20671 | In order to explain both order and evil, a single evil creator is best, but no one favours that [Harari] |
| 20664 | Animism is belief that every part of nature is aware and feeling, and can communicate [Harari] |
| 20666 | Most polytheist recognise one supreme power or law, behind the various gods [Harari] |
| 20667 | Polytheism is open-minded, and rarely persecutes opponents [Harari] |
| 20665 | Mythologies are usual contracts with the gods, exchanging devotion for control of nature [Harari] |
| 20669 | Dualist religions see everything as a battleground of good and evil forces [Harari] |
| 20670 | Dualist religions say the cosmos is a battleground, so can’t explain its order [Harari] |
| 20673 | Manichaeans and Gnostics: good made spirit, evil made flesh [Harari] |
| 20668 | Monotheism appeared in Egypt in 1350 BCE, when the god Aten was declared supreme [Harari] |