94 ideas
| 1695 | Without extensive examination firm statements are hard, but studying the difficulties is profitable [Aristotle] |
| 1697 | The contrary of good is bad, but the contrary of bad is either good or another evil [Aristotle] |
| 1698 | Both sides of contraries need not exist (as health without sickness, white without black) [Aristotle] |
| 11034 | The differentiae of genera which are different are themselves different in kind [Aristotle] |
| 18367 | A true existence statement has its truth caused by the existence of the thing [Aristotle] |
| 11033 | Predications of predicates are predications of their subjects [Aristotle] |
| 11044 | One is prior to two, because its existence is implied by two [Aristotle] |
| 11042 | Parts of a line join at a point, so it is continuous [Aristotle] |
| 11041 | Some quantities are discrete, like number, and others continuous, like lines, time and space [Aristotle] |
| 11286 | Primary being must be more than mere indeterminate ultimate subject of predication [Politis on Aristotle] |
| 1700 | There are six kinds of change: generation, destruction, increase, diminution, alteration, change of place [Aristotle] |
| 1699 | A thing is prior to another if it implies its existence [Aristotle] |
| 18366 | Of interdependent things, the prior one causes the other's existence [Aristotle] |
| 2392 | Properties supervene if you can't have one without the other [Chalmers] |
| 2393 | Logical supervenience is when one set of properties must be accompanied by another set [Chalmers] |
| 2394 | Natural supervenience is when one set of properties is always accompanied by another set [Chalmers] |
| 2398 | Reduction requires logical supervenience [Chalmers] |
| 16048 | Physicalism says in any two physically indiscernible worlds the positive facts are the same [Chalmers, by Bennett,K] |
| 3311 | The categories (substance, quality, quantity, relation, action, passion, place, time) peter out inconsequentially [Benardete,JA on Aristotle] |
| 11035 | There are ten basic categories for thinking about things [Aristotle] |
| 13121 | Substance,Quantity,Quality,Relation,Place,Time,Being-in-a-position,Having,Doing,Being affected [Aristotle, by Westerhoff] |
| 2401 | All facts are either physical, experiential, laws of nature, second-order final facts, or indexical facts about me [Chalmers] |
| 16116 | Aristotle derived categories as answers to basic questions about nature, size, quality, location etc. [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 21345 | Aristotle said relations are not substances, so (if they exist) they must be accidents [Aristotle, by Heil] |
| 16155 | Aristotle promoted the importance of properties and objects (rather than general and particular) [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 11032 | Some things said 'of' a subject are not 'in' the subject [Aristotle] |
| 11038 | We call them secondary 'substances' because they reveal the primary substances [Aristotle] |
| 16739 | Four species of quality: states, capacities, affects, and forms [Aristotle, by Pasnau] |
| 11037 | Colour must be in an individual body, or it is not embodied [Aristotle] |
| 16154 | Aristotle gave up his earlier notion of individuals, because it relied on universals [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 12351 | Genus and species are substances, because only they reveal the primary substance [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
| 1694 | Substances have no opposites, and don't come in degrees (including if the substance is a man) [Aristotle] |
| 16091 | Is primary substance just an ultimate subject, or some aspect of a complex body? [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
| 11280 | Primary being is 'that which lies under', or 'particular substance' [Aristotle, by Politis] |
| 11040 | A single substance can receive contrary properties [Aristotle] |
| 16140 | Secondary substances do have subjects, so they are not ultimate in the ontology [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
| 10965 | In earlier Aristotle the substances were particulars, not kinds [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred] |
| 11036 | A 'primary' substance is in each subject, with species or genera as 'secondary' substances [Aristotle] |
| 8287 | Earlier Aristotle had objects as primary substances, but later he switched to substantial form [Aristotle, by Lowe] |
| 12350 | Things are called 'substances' because they are subjects for everything else [Aristotle] |
| 11039 | A primary substance reveals a 'this', which is an individual unit [Aristotle] |
| 12361 | Primary substances are ontological in 'Categories', and explanatory in 'Metaphysics' [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
| 3315 | Aristotle denigrates the category of relation, but for modern absolutists self-relation is basic [Benardete,JA on Aristotle] |
| 16424 | Strong metaphysical necessity allows fewer possible worlds than logical necessity [Chalmers] |
| 16425 | Metaphysical necessity is a bizarre, brute and inexplicable constraint on possibilities [Chalmers] |
| 16426 | How can we know the metaphysical impossibilities; the a posteriori only concerns this world [Chalmers] |
| 13956 | Kripke is often taken to be challenging a priori insights into necessity [Chalmers] |
| 13963 | Maybe logical possibility does imply conceivability - by an ideal mind [Chalmers] |
| 2407 | One can wrongly imagine two things being non-identical even though they are the same (morning/evening star) [Chalmers] |
| 2390 | We attribute beliefs to people in order to explain their behaviour [Chalmers] |
| 2397 | 'Perception' means either an action or a mental state [Chalmers] |
| 2422 | The structure of the retina has already simplified the colour information which hits it [Chalmers] |
| 2396 | Reductive explanation is not the be-all and the end-all of explanation [Chalmers] |
| 2426 | Why are minds homogeneous and brains fine-grained? [Chalmers] |
| 2391 | Can we be aware but not conscious? [Chalmers] |
| 2412 | Can we explain behaviour without consciousness? [Chalmers] |
| 2386 | Hard Problem: why brains experience things [Chalmers] |
| 2416 | What turns awareness into consciousness? [Chalmers] |
| 2423 | Going down the scale, where would consciousness vanish? [Chalmers] |
| 2403 | Nothing in physics even suggests consciousness [Chalmers] |
| 2400 | Is intentionality just causal connections? [Chalmers] |
| 2389 | Sometimes we don't notice our pains [Chalmers] |
| 2419 | Why should qualia fade during silicon replacement? [Chalmers] |
| 2402 | It seems possible to invert qualia [Chalmers] |
| 2415 | In blindsight both qualia and intentionality are missing [Chalmers] |
| 2414 | When distracted we can totally misjudge our own experiences [Chalmers] |
| 2409 | Maybe dualist interaction is possible at the quantum level? [Chalmers] |
| 2411 | Supervenience makes interaction laws possible [Chalmers] |
| 2424 | It is odd if experience is a very recent development [Chalmers] |
| 2413 | If I can have a zombie twin, my own behaviour doesn't need consciousness [Chalmers] |
| 2417 | Does consciousness arise from fine-grained non-reductive functional organisation? [Chalmers] |
| 2428 | Maybe the whole Chinese Room understands Chinese, though the person doesn't [Chalmers] |
| 2418 | The Chinese Mind doesn't seem conscious, but then nor do brains from outside [Chalmers] |
| 2406 | H2O causes liquidity, but no one is a dualist about that [Chalmers] |
| 2405 | Perhaps consciousness is physically based, but not logically required by that base [Chalmers] |
| 2395 | Zombies imply natural but not logical supervenience [Chalmers] |
| 9318 | Phenomenal consciousness is fundamental, with no possible nonphenomenal explanation [Chalmers, by Kriegel/Williford] |
| 2404 | Nothing external shows whether a mouse is conscious [Chalmers] |
| 2429 | Temperature (etc.) is agreed to be reducible, but it is multiply realisable [Chalmers] |
| 18403 | Indexicals may not be objective, but they are a fact about the world as I see it [Chalmers] |
| 12349 | Only what can be said of many things is a predicable [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
| 11837 | Some predicates signify qualification of a substance, others the substance itself [Aristotle] |
| 14708 | Rationalist 2D semantics posits necessary relations between meaning, apriority, and possibility [Chalmers, by Schroeter] |
| 13958 | The 'primary intension' is non-empirical, and fixes extensions based on the actual-world reference [Chalmers] |
| 2399 | Meaning has split into primary ("watery stuff"), and secondary counterfactual meaning ("H2O") [Chalmers] |
| 13959 | The 'secondary intension' is determined by rigidifying (as H2O) the 'water' picked out in the actual world [Chalmers] |
| 13957 | Primary and secondary intensions are the a priori (actual) and a posteriori (counterfactual) aspects of meaning [Chalmers] |
| 13961 | We have 'primary' truth-conditions for the actual world, and derived 'secondary' ones for counterfactual worlds [Chalmers] |
| 13962 | Two-dimensional semantics gives a 'primary' and 'secondary' proposition for each statement [Chalmers] |
| 13960 | In two-dimensional semantics we have two aspects to truth in virtue of meaning [Chalmers] |
| 11043 | It is not possible for fire to be cold or snow black [Aristotle] |
| 1696 | Change goes from possession to loss (as in baldness), but not the other way round [Aristotle] |
| 16427 | Presumably God can do anything which is logically possible [Chalmers] |
| 7902 | The Buddha made flowers float in the air, to impress people, and make them listen [Mahavastu] |