14 ideas
| 10061 | The If-thenist view only seems to work for the axiomatised portions of mathematics [Musgrave] |
| 10065 | Perhaps If-thenism survives in mathematics if we stick to first-order logic [Musgrave] |
| 18946 | Unreflectively, we all assume there are nonexistents, and we can refer to them [Reimer] |
| 10049 | Logical truths may contain non-logical notions, as in 'all men are men' [Musgrave] |
| 10050 | A statement is logically true if it comes out true in all interpretations in all (non-empty) domains [Musgrave] |
| 17435 | Objects do not naturally form countable units [Koslicki] |
| 17433 | We can still count squares, even if they overlap [Koslicki] |
| 17439 | There is no deep reason why we count carrots but not asparagus [Koslicki] |
| 17434 | We struggle to count branches and waves because our concepts lack clear boundaries [Koslicki] |
| 10058 | No two numbers having the same successor relies on the Axiom of Infinity [Musgrave] |
| 10063 | Formalism is a bulwark of logical positivism [Musgrave] |
| 10062 | Formalism seems to exclude all creative, growing mathematics [Musgrave] |
| 17436 | We talk of snow as what stays the same, when it is a heap or drift or expanse [Koslicki] |
| 10060 | Logical positivists adopted an If-thenist version of logicism about numbers [Musgrave] |