Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Problem of Empty Names', 'Foundations of Geometry' and 'Apriority as an Evaluative Notion'

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10 ideas

2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 4. Circularity
9161 Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view [Field,H]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
10053 Geometrical axioms imply the propositions, but the former may not be true [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
18946 Unreflectively, we all assume there are nonexistents, and we can refer to them [Reimer]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
10052 Geometry is united by the intuitive axioms of projective geometry [Russell, by Musgrave]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
9160 Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible [Field,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
9164 We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence [Field,H]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
9165 Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes [Field,H]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
9162 Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that [Field,H]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
9166 People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct' [Field,H]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
9163 If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori [Field,H]