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All the ideas for 'The Problem of Empty Names', 'Properties' and 'How to Define Theoretical Terms'

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24 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
4036 What matters is not how many entities we postulate, but how many kinds of entities [Armstrong, by Mellor/Oliver]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
15527 Defining terms either enables elimination, or shows that they don't require elimination [Lewis]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
18946 Unreflectively, we all assume there are nonexistents, and we can refer to them [Reimer]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
15754 Without properties we would be unable to express the laws of nature [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
4034 Whether we apply 'cold' or 'hot' to an object is quite separate from its change of temperature [Armstrong]
8535 To the claim that every predicate has a property, start by eliminating failure of application of predicate [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
8537 Tropes fall into classes, because exact similarity is symmetrical and transitive [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
8538 Trope theory needs extra commitments, to symmetry and non-transitivity, unless resemblance is exact [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
8539 Universals are required to give a satisfactory account of the laws of nature [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
8529 Deniers of properties and relations rely on either predicates or on classes [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
8532 Resemblances must be in certain 'respects', and they seem awfully like properties [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
8530 Change of temperature in objects is quite independent of the predicates 'hot' and 'cold' [Armstrong]
8536 We want to know what constituents of objects are grounds for the application of predicates [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
8531 In most sets there is no property common to all the members [Armstrong]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
15753 Essences might support Resemblance Nominalism, but they are too coarse and ill-defined [Armstrong]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
15530 A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world [Lewis]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 8. Ramsey Sentences
15531 The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation [Lewis]
15528 A Ramsey sentence just asserts that a theory can be realised, without saying by what [Lewis]
15526 There is a method for defining new scientific terms just using the terms we already understand [Lewis]
15529 It is better to have one realisation of a theory than many - but it may not always be possible [Lewis]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
8533 Predicates need ontological correlates to ensure that they apply [Armstrong]
4035 There must be some explanation of why certain predicates are applicable to certain objects [Armstrong]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
8540 The introduction of sparse properties avoids the regularity theory's problem with 'grue' [Armstrong]
8541 Regularities theories are poor on causal connections, counterfactuals and probability [Armstrong]