Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Problem of Empty Names', 'works' and 'Pragmatism and Deflationism'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
21970 Philosophy attains its goal if one person feels perfect accord between their system and experience [Fichte]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
6912 For Fichte there is no God outside the ego, and 'our religion is reason' [Fichte, by Feuerbach]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
19108 Truth is proper assertion, but that has varying standards [Misak]
19094 For pragmatists the loftiest idea of truth is just a feature of what remains forever assertible [Misak]
19105 Truth isn't a grand elusive property, if it is just the aim of our assertions and inquiries [Misak]
19100 Truth makes disagreements matter, or worth settling [Misak]
19099 'True' is used for emphasis, clarity, assertion, comparison, objectivity, meaning, negation, consequence... [Misak]
19103 'That's true' doesn't just refer back to a sentence, but implies sustained evidence for it [Misak]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
19101 Disquotation is bivalent [Misak]
19096 Disquotationalism resembles a telephone directory [Misak]
19106 Disquotations says truth is assertion, and assertion proclaims truth - but what is 'assertion'? [Misak]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
19098 Deflating the correspondence theory doesn't entail deflating all the other theories [Misak]
19104 Deflationism isn't a theory of truth, but an account of its role in natural language [Misak]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
18946 Unreflectively, we all assume there are nonexistents, and we can refer to them [Reimer]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
19109 The anti-realism debate concerns whether indefeasibility is a plausible aim of inquiry [Misak]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
21973 Fichte believed in things-in-themselves [Fichte, by Moore,AW]
21914 We can deduce experience from self-consciousness, without the thing-in-itself [Fichte]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
20951 The absolute I divides into consciousness, and a world which is not-I [Fichte, by Bowie]
21964 Reason arises from freedom, so philosophy starts from the self, and not from the laws of nature [Fichte]
21968 Abandon the thing-in-itself; things only exist in relation to our thinking [Fichte]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
21965 Spinoza could not actually believe his determinism, because living requires free will [Fichte]