25 ideas
18946 | Unreflectively, we all assume there are nonexistents, and we can refer to them [Reimer] |
18529 | Relations are expressed either as absolute facts, or by a relational concept [William of Ockham] |
11897 | A principle of individuation may pinpoint identity and distinctness, now and over time [Mackie,P] |
11898 | Individuation may include counterfactual possibilities, as well as identity and persistence [Mackie,P] |
11883 | A haecceity is the essential, simple, unanalysable property of being-this-thing [Mackie,P] |
16779 | Cut wood doesn't make a new substance, but seems to make separate subjects [William of Ockham] |
16757 | Hot water naturally cools down, which is due to the substantial form of the water [William of Ockham] |
11889 | Essentialism must avoid both reduplication of essences, and multiple occupancy by essences [Mackie,P] |
11877 | An individual essence is the properties the object could not exist without [Mackie,P] |
11882 | No other object can possibly have the same individual essence as some object [Mackie,P] |
11886 | There are problems both with individual essences and without them [Mackie,P] |
11909 | Unlike Hesperus=Phosophorus, water=H2O needs further premisses before it is necessary [Mackie,P] |
11899 | Why are any sortals essential, and why are only some of them essential? [Mackie,P] |
11906 | The Kripke and Putnam view of kinds makes them explanatorily basic, but has modal implications [Mackie,P] |
11894 | Origin is not a necessity, it is just 'tenacious'; we keep it fixed in counterfactual discussions [Mackie,P] |
11887 | Transworld identity without individual essences leads to 'bare identities' [Mackie,P] |
11890 | De re modality without bare identities or individual essence needs counterparts [Mackie,P] |
11892 | Things may only be counterparts under some particular relation [Mackie,P] |
11893 | Possibilities for Caesar must be based on some phase of the real Caesar [Mackie,P] |
11884 | The theory of 'haecceitism' does not need commitment to individual haecceities [Mackie,P] |
11905 | Locke's kind essences are explanatory, without being necessary to the kind [Mackie,P] |
9102 | If an animal approached from a distance, we might abstract 'animal' from one instance [William of Ockham] |
9114 | There are no secure foundations to prove the separate existence of mind, in reason or experience [William of Ockham] |
11907 | Maybe the identity of kinds is necessary, but instances being of that kind is not [Mackie,P] |
9115 | To love God means to love whatever God wills to be loved [William of Ockham] |