40 ideas
18946 | Unreflectively, we all assume there are nonexistents, and we can refer to them [Reimer] |
2730 | Because 'gold is malleable' is necessary does not mean that it is analytic [Audi,R] |
2715 | Beliefs are based on perception, memory, introspection or reason [Audi,R] |
2735 | Could you have a single belief on its own? [Audi,R] |
2736 | We can make certain of what we know, so knowing does not entail certainty [Audi,R] |
2722 | Sense-data theory is indirect realism, but phenomenalism is direct irrealism [Audi,R] |
2721 | If you gradually remove a book's sensory properties, what is left at the end? [Audi,R] |
2728 | The concepts needed for a priori thought may come from experience [Audi,R] |
2727 | Red and green being exclusive colours seems to be rationally graspable but not analytic [Audi,R] |
2716 | To see something as a field, I obviously need the concept of a field [Audi,R] |
2717 | How could I see a field and believe nothing regarding it? [Audi,R] |
2719 | Sense data imply representative realism, possibly only representing primary qualities [Audi,R] |
2720 | Sense-data (and the rival 'adverbial' theory) are to explain illusions and hallucinations [Audi,R] |
2718 | Perception is first simple, then objectual (with concepts) and then propositional [Audi,R] |
2729 | Virtually all rationalists assert that we can have knowledge of synthetic a priori truths [Audi,R] |
2741 | The principles of justification have to be a priori [Audi,R] |
2725 | To remember something is to know it [Audi,R] |
2724 | I might remember someone I can't recall or image, by recognising them on meeting [Audi,R] |
2731 | Justification is either unanchored (infinite or circular), or anchored (in knowledge or non-knowledge) [Audi,R] |
2739 | Internalism about justification implies that there is a right to believe something [Audi,R] |
2732 | Maths may be consistent with observations, but not coherent [Audi,R] |
2733 | It is very hard to show how much coherence is needed for justification [Audi,R] |
2734 | A consistent madman could have a very coherent belief system [Audi,R] |
2738 | Consistent accurate prediction looks like knowledge without justified belief [Audi,R] |
2740 | A reliability theory of knowledge seems to involve truth as correspondence [Audi,R] |
2737 | 'Reliable' is a very imprecise term, and may even mean 'justified' [Audi,R] |
2726 | We can be ignorant about ourselves, for example, our desires and motives [Audi,R] |
12157 | Kant gave form and status to aesthetics, and Hegel gave it content [Kant, by Scruton] |
20346 | The aesthetic attitude is a matter of disinterestedness [Kant, by Wollheim] |
18547 | Only rational beings can experience beauty [Kant, by Scruton] |
20408 | With respect to the senses, taste is an entirely personal matter [Kant] |
20409 | When we judge beauty, it isn't just personal; we judge on behalf of everybody [Kant] |
20411 | Saying everyone has their own taste destroys the very idea of taste [Kant] |
22711 | The beautiful is not conceptualised as moral, but it symbolises or resembles goodness [Kant, by Murdoch] |
4025 | Kant saw beauty as a sort of disinterested pleasure, which has become separate from the good [Kant, by Taylor,C] |
20412 | Beauty is only judged in pure contemplation, and not with something else at stake [Kant] |
22046 | The mathematical sublime is immeasurable greatness; the dynamical sublime is overpowering [Kant, by Pinkard] |
21458 | The sublime is a moral experience [Kant, by Gardner] |
5643 | Aesthetic values are not objectively valid, but we must treat them as if they are [Kant, by Scruton] |
20410 | The judgement of beauty is not cognitive, but relates, via imagination, to pleasurable feelings [Kant] |