17 ideas
5300 | Philosophers have interpreted the world, but the point is to change it [Marx] |
5297 | Whether human thinking can be 'true' must be decided in practice, not theory [Marx] |
16405 | To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker] |
18946 | Unreflectively, we all assume there are nonexistents, and we can refer to them [Reimer] |
16407 | Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular [Stalnaker] |
16397 | If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker] |
16399 | Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker] |
16398 | Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker] |
16396 | Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical [Stalnaker] |
16408 | Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker] |
22598 | The authentic self exists at the level of class, rather than the individual [Marx, by Dunt] |
16406 | If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker] |
16404 | In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker] |
16403 | 'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts [Stalnaker] |
16401 | To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true [Stalnaker] |
5298 | The human essence is not found in individuals but in social relations [Marx] |
5299 | Religious feeling is social in origin [Marx] |