30 ideas
| 6161 | Structuralism is neo-Kantian idealism, with language playing the role of categories of understanding [Rowlands] |
| 6163 | If bivalence is rejected, then excluded middle must also be rejected [Rowlands] |
| 5791 | Reduction is either by elimination, or by explanation [Searle] |
| 5799 | Eliminative reduction needs a gap between appearance and reality, as in sunsets [Searle] |
| 6155 | Supervenience is a one-way relation of dependence or determination between properties [Rowlands] |
| 5790 | A property is 'emergent' if it is caused by elements of a system, when the elements lack the property [Searle] |
| 6154 | It is argued that wholes possess modal and counterfactual properties that parts lack [Rowlands] |
| 6157 | Tokens are dated, concrete particulars; types are their general properties or kinds [Rowlands] |
| 14781 | A 'belief' is a habit which determines how our imagination and actions proceed [Peirce] |
| 6159 | Strong idealism is the sort of mess produced by a Cartesian separation of mind and world [Rowlands] |
| 6152 | Minds are rational, conscious, subjective, self-knowing, free, meaningful and self-aware [Rowlands] |
| 5792 | Explanation of how we unify our mental stimuli into a single experience is the 'binding problem' [Searle] |
| 6173 | Content externalism implies that we do not have privileged access to our own minds [Rowlands] |
| 6174 | If someone is secretly transported to Twin Earth, others know their thoughts better than they do [Rowlands] |
| 5786 | A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot [Searle] |
| 5794 | Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint [Searle] |
| 5795 | There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't [Searle] |
| 5788 | The use of 'qualia' seems to imply that consciousness and qualia are separate [Searle] |
| 5789 | I now think syntax is not in the physics, but in the eye of the beholder [Searle] |
| 5798 | Consciousness has a first-person ontology, so it cannot be reduced without omitting something [Searle] |
| 5787 | There is non-event causation between mind and brain, as between a table and its solidity [Searle] |
| 6158 | Supervenience of mental and physical properties often comes with token-identity of mental and physical particulars [Rowlands] |
| 5797 | The pattern of molecules in the sea is much more complex than the complexity of brain neurons [Searle] |
| 5796 | If tree rings contain information about age, then age contains information about rings [Searle] |
| 6168 | The content of a thought is just the meaning of a sentence [Rowlands] |
| 6167 | Action is bodily movement caused by intentional states [Rowlands] |
| 6177 | Moral intuition seems unevenly distributed between people [Rowlands] |
| 6156 | The 17th century reintroduced atoms as mathematical modes of Euclidean space [Rowlands] |
| 6170 | Natural kinds are defined by their real essence, as in gold having atomic number 79 [Rowlands] |
| 6178 | It is common to see the value of nature in one feature, such as life, diversity, or integrity [Rowlands] |