38 ideas
| 6161 | Structuralism is neo-Kantian idealism, with language playing the role of categories of understanding [Rowlands] |
| 6163 | If bivalence is rejected, then excluded middle must also be rejected [Rowlands] |
| 22121 | The concept of being has only one meaning, whether talking of universals or of God [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
| 22122 | Being (not sensation or God) is the primary object of the intellect [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
| 6155 | Supervenience is a one-way relation of dependence or determination between properties [Rowlands] |
| 22125 | Duns Scotus was a realist about universals [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
| 22127 | Scotus said a substantial principle of individuation [haecceitas] was needed for an essence [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
| 6154 | It is argued that wholes possess modal and counterfactual properties that parts lack [Rowlands] |
| 22126 | Avicenna and Duns Scotus say essences have independent and prior existence [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
| 6157 | Tokens are dated, concrete particulars; types are their general properties or kinds [Rowlands] |
| 20189 | Belief is a feeling, independent of the will, which arises from uncontrolled and unknown causes [Hume] |
| 22129 | Certainty comes from the self-evident, from induction, and from self-awareness [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
| 22130 | Scotus defended direct 'intuitive cognition', against the abstractive view [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
| 6159 | Strong idealism is the sort of mess produced by a Cartesian separation of mind and world [Rowlands] |
| 22128 | Augustine's 'illumination' theory of knowledge leads to nothing but scepticism [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
| 21309 | A proposition cannot be intelligible or consistent, if the perceptions are not so [Hume] |
| 6152 | Minds are rational, conscious, subjective, self-knowing, free, meaningful and self-aware [Rowlands] |
| 6173 | Content externalism implies that we do not have privileged access to our own minds [Rowlands] |
| 6174 | If someone is secretly transported to Twin Earth, others know their thoughts better than they do [Rowlands] |
| 15755 | Hume needs a notion which includes degrees of resemblance [Shoemaker on Hume] |
| 5323 | Experiences are logically separate, but factually linked by simultaneity or a feeling of continuousness [Ayer on Hume] |
| 21311 | Are self and substance the same? Then how can self remain if substance changes? [Hume] |
| 21312 | Perceptions are distinct, so no connection between them can ever be discovered [Hume] |
| 21308 | We have no impression of the self, and we therefore have no idea of it [Hume] |
| 21310 | Does an oyster with one perception have a self? Would lots of perceptions change that? [Hume] |
| 22131 | The will retains its power for opposites, even when it is acting [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
| 6158 | Supervenience of mental and physical properties often comes with token-identity of mental and physical particulars [Rowlands] |
| 6168 | The content of a thought is just the meaning of a sentence [Rowlands] |
| 6167 | Action is bodily movement caused by intentional states [Rowlands] |
| 6177 | Moral intuition seems unevenly distributed between people [Rowlands] |
| 23115 | We have no natural love of mankind, other than through various relationships [Hume] |
| 6156 | The 17th century reintroduced atoms as mathematical modes of Euclidean space [Rowlands] |
| 6170 | Natural kinds are defined by their real essence, as in gold having atomic number 79 [Rowlands] |
| 16946 | Causation is just invariance, as long as it is described in general terms [Quine on Hume] |
| 15250 | If impressions, memories and ideas only differ in vivacity, nothing says it is memory, or repetition [Whitehead on Hume] |
| 6178 | It is common to see the value of nature in one feature, such as life, diversity, or integrity [Rowlands] |
| 22123 | The concept of God is the unique first efficient cause, final cause, and most eminent being [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
| 22124 | We can't infer the infinity of God from creation ex nihilo [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |