38 ideas
6161 | Structuralism is neo-Kantian idealism, with language playing the role of categories of understanding [Rowlands] |
6163 | If bivalence is rejected, then excluded middle must also be rejected [Rowlands] |
6155 | Supervenience is a one-way relation of dependence or determination between properties [Rowlands] |
17377 | All descriptive language is classificatory [Dupré] |
17376 | We should aim for a classification which tells us as much as possible about the object [Dupré] |
6154 | It is argued that wholes possess modal and counterfactual properties that parts lack [Rowlands] |
17390 | Natural kinds don't need essentialism to be explanatory [Dupré] |
17389 | A species might have its essential genetic mechanism replaced by a new one [Dupré] |
17388 | It seems that species lack essential properties, so they can't be natural kinds [Dupré] |
6157 | Tokens are dated, concrete particulars; types are their general properties or kinds [Rowlands] |
6159 | Strong idealism is the sort of mess produced by a Cartesian separation of mind and world [Rowlands] |
12580 | Experiences have no conceptual content [Evans, by Greco] |
7643 | We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour [Evans] |
17374 | The possibility of prediction rests on determinism [Dupré] |
6152 | Minds are rational, conscious, subjective, self-knowing, free, meaningful and self-aware [Rowlands] |
6173 | Content externalism implies that we do not have privileged access to our own minds [Rowlands] |
6174 | If someone is secretly transported to Twin Earth, others know their thoughts better than they do [Rowlands] |
6158 | Supervenience of mental and physical properties often comes with token-identity of mental and physical particulars [Rowlands] |
23794 | Some representational states, like perception, may be nonconceptual [Evans, by Schulte] |
6168 | The content of a thought is just the meaning of a sentence [Rowlands] |
17378 | Presumably molecular structure seems important because we never have the Twin Earth experience [Dupré] |
16366 | The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything [Evans] |
12575 | Concepts have a 'Generality Constraint', that we must know how predicates apply to them [Evans, by Peacocke] |
6167 | Action is bodily movement caused by intentional states [Rowlands] |
6177 | Moral intuition seems unevenly distributed between people [Rowlands] |
6156 | The 17th century reintroduced atoms as mathematical modes of Euclidean space [Rowlands] |
17381 | Phylogenetics involves history, and cladism rests species on splits in lineage [Dupré] |
17385 | Kinds don't do anything (including evolve) because they are abstract [Dupré] |
6170 | Natural kinds are defined by their real essence, as in gold having atomic number 79 [Rowlands] |
17382 | Cooks, unlike scientists, distinguish garlic from onions [Dupré] |
17375 | Natural kinds are decided entirely by the intentions of our classification [Dupré] |
17379 | Borders between species are much less clear in vegetables than among animals [Dupré] |
17384 | Even atoms of an element differ, in the energy levels of their electrons [Dupré] |
17387 | Ecologists favour classifying by niche, even though that can clash with genealogy [Dupré] |
17380 | Wales may count as fish [Dupré] |
6178 | It is common to see the value of nature in one feature, such as life, diversity, or integrity [Rowlands] |
17383 | Species are the lowest-level classification in biology [Dupré] |
17386 | The theory of evolution is mainly about species [Dupré] |