Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Externalism', 'Ignorance: a Case for Scepticism' and 'World and Essence'

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30 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 4. Linguistic Structuralism
Structuralism is neo-Kantian idealism, with language playing the role of categories of understanding [Rowlands]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
If bivalence is rejected, then excluded middle must also be rejected [Rowlands]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Supervenience is a one-way relation of dependence or determination between properties [Rowlands]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
The 'identity criteria' of a name are a group of essential and established facts [Plantinga]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
'Being Socrates' and 'being identical with Socrates' characterise Socrates, so they are among his properties [Plantinga]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
It is argued that wholes possess modal and counterfactual properties that parts lack [Rowlands]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them? [Plantinga]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Properties are 'trivially essential' if they are instantiated by every object in every possible world [Plantinga]
X is essentially P if it is P in every world, or in every X-world, or in the actual world (and not ¬P elsewhere) [Plantinga]
If a property is ever essential, can it only ever be an essential property? [Plantinga]
Essences are instantiated, and are what entails a thing's properties and lack of properties [Plantinga]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
Tokens are dated, concrete particulars; types are their general properties or kinds [Rowlands]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it [Plantinga]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
'De re' modality is as clear as 'de dicto' modality, because they are logically equivalent [Plantinga]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
We can imagine being beetles or alligators, so it is possible we might have such bodies [Plantinga]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
Strong idealism is the sort of mess produced by a Cartesian separation of mind and world [Rowlands]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism
The meaning of 'know' does not change from courtroom to living room [Unger]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
No one knows anything, and no one is ever justified or reasonable [Unger]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 4. Demon Scepticism
An evil scientist may give you a momentary life, with totally false memories [Unger]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
Minds are rational, conscious, subjective, self-knowing, free, meaningful and self-aware [Rowlands]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
Content externalism implies that we do not have privileged access to our own minds [Rowlands]
If someone is secretly transported to Twin Earth, others know their thoughts better than they do [Rowlands]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Supervenience of mental and physical properties often comes with token-identity of mental and physical particulars [Rowlands]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
The content of a thought is just the meaning of a sentence [Rowlands]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
Action is bodily movement caused by intentional states [Rowlands]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Moral intuition seems unevenly distributed between people [Rowlands]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
The 17th century reintroduced atoms as mathematical modes of Euclidean space [Rowlands]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
Natural kinds are defined by their real essence, as in gold having atomic number 79 [Rowlands]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 4. Ecology
It is common to see the value of nature in one feature, such as life, diversity, or integrity [Rowlands]