Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Externalism', 'On Signs (damaged)' and 'Freedom of the Will and concept of a person'

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24 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 4. Linguistic Structuralism
6161 Structuralism is neo-Kantian idealism, with language playing the role of categories of understanding [Rowlands]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
6163 If bivalence is rejected, then excluded middle must also be rejected [Rowlands]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
6155 Supervenience is a one-way relation of dependence or determination between properties [Rowlands]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
6154 It is argued that wholes possess modal and counterfactual properties that parts lack [Rowlands]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
6157 Tokens are dated, concrete particulars; types are their general properties or kinds [Rowlands]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
6159 Strong idealism is the sort of mess produced by a Cartesian separation of mind and world [Rowlands]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
6027 From the fact that some men die, we cannot infer that they all do [Philodemus]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
6152 Minds are rational, conscious, subjective, self-knowing, free, meaningful and self-aware [Rowlands]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
6173 Content externalism implies that we do not have privileged access to our own minds [Rowlands]
6174 If someone is secretly transported to Twin Earth, others know their thoughts better than they do [Rowlands]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
9264 Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt]
9266 A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
9267 Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
6158 Supervenience of mental and physical properties often comes with token-identity of mental and physical particulars [Rowlands]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
6168 The content of a thought is just the meaning of a sentence [Rowlands]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
6167 Action is bodily movement caused by intentional states [Rowlands]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
9265 The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action [Frankfurt]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
20015 Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
9270 A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions [Frankfurt]
9269 A person may be morally responsible without free will [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
6177 Moral intuition seems unevenly distributed between people [Rowlands]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
6156 The 17th century reintroduced atoms as mathematical modes of Euclidean space [Rowlands]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
6170 Natural kinds are defined by their real essence, as in gold having atomic number 79 [Rowlands]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 4. Ecology
6178 It is common to see the value of nature in one feature, such as life, diversity, or integrity [Rowlands]