31 ideas
| 17713 | After 1903, Husserl avoids metaphysical commitments [Mares] |
| 6161 | Structuralism is neo-Kantian idealism, with language playing the role of categories of understanding [Rowlands] |
| 6163 | If bivalence is rejected, then excluded middle must also be rejected [Rowlands] |
| 17715 | The truth of the axioms doesn't matter for pure mathematics, but it does for applied [Mares] |
| 17716 | Mathematics is relations between properties we abstract from experience [Mares] |
| 6155 | Supervenience is a one-way relation of dependence or determination between properties [Rowlands] |
| 6154 | It is argued that wholes possess modal and counterfactual properties that parts lack [Rowlands] |
| 6157 | Tokens are dated, concrete particulars; types are their general properties or kinds [Rowlands] |
| 17703 | Light in straight lines is contingent a priori; stipulated as straight, because they happen to be so [Mares] |
| 6159 | Strong idealism is the sort of mess produced by a Cartesian separation of mind and world [Rowlands] |
| 17714 | Aristotelians dislike the idea of a priori judgements from pure reason [Mares] |
| 17705 | Empiricists say rationalists mistake imaginative powers for modal insights [Mares] |
| 17700 | The most popular view is that coherent beliefs explain one another [Mares] |
| 17704 | Operationalism defines concepts by our ways of measuring them [Mares] |
| 6152 | Minds are rational, conscious, subjective, self-knowing, free, meaningful and self-aware [Rowlands] |
| 6173 | Content externalism implies that we do not have privileged access to our own minds [Rowlands] |
| 6174 | If someone is secretly transported to Twin Earth, others know their thoughts better than they do [Rowlands] |
| 6158 | Supervenience of mental and physical properties often comes with token-identity of mental and physical particulars [Rowlands] |
| 6168 | The content of a thought is just the meaning of a sentence [Rowlands] |
| 17710 | Aristotelian justification uses concepts abstracted from experience [Mares] |
| 17706 | The essence of a concept is either its definition or its conceptual relations? [Mares] |
| 17701 | Possible worlds semantics has a nice compositional account of modal statements [Mares] |
| 17702 | Unstructured propositions are sets of possible worlds; structured ones have components [Mares] |
| 6167 | Action is bodily movement caused by intentional states [Rowlands] |
| 6177 | Moral intuition seems unevenly distributed between people [Rowlands] |
| 23405 | Rituals escape natural chaos, and benefit everyone, by reshaping our motivations [Xunzi (Xun Kuang), by Norden] |
| 23406 | Rituals don't arise from human nature; they are the deliberate creations of a sage [Xunzi (Xun Kuang)] |
| 6156 | The 17th century reintroduced atoms as mathematical modes of Euclidean space [Rowlands] |
| 6170 | Natural kinds are defined by their real essence, as in gold having atomic number 79 [Rowlands] |
| 17708 | Maybe space has points, but processes always need regions with a size [Mares] |
| 6178 | It is common to see the value of nature in one feature, such as life, diversity, or integrity [Rowlands] |