Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Essence of Reference', 'Subjective View: sec qualities and indexicals' and 'Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy'

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32 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 1. History of Philosophy
19441 All philosophies presuppose their historical moment, and arise from it [Feuerbach]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
19442 I don't study Plato for his own sake; the primary aim is always understanding [Feuerbach]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
19445 A dialectician has to be his own opponent [Feuerbach]
19444 Each proposition has an antithesis, and truth exists as its refutation [Feuerbach]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
19443 Truth forges an impersonal unity between people [Feuerbach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
10429 It is best to say that a name designates iff there is something for it to designate [Sainsbury]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
10425 Definite descriptions may not be referring expressions, since they can fail to refer [Sainsbury]
10438 Definite descriptions are usually rigid in subject, but not in predicate, position [Sainsbury]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
22427 To explain object qualities, primary qualities must be more than mere sources of experience [McGinn]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
19446 To our consciousness it is language which looks unreal [Feuerbach]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
19447 The Absolute is the 'and' which unites 'spirit and nature' [Feuerbach]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
22415 Relativity means differing secondary perceptions are not real disagreements [McGinn]
22416 Phenomenalism is correct for secondary qualities, so scepticism is there impossible [McGinn]
22422 Maybe all possible sense experience must involve both secondary and primary qualities [McGinn]
22428 You understood being red if you know the experience involved; not so with thngs being square [McGinn]
22413 Being red simply consists in looking red [McGinn]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
22414 You don't need to know how a square thing looks or feels to understand squareness [McGinn]
22423 Touch doesn't provide direct experience of primary qualities, because touch feels temperature [McGinn]
22426 We can perceive objectively, because primary qualities are not mind-created [McGinn]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
22412 Lockean secondary qualities (unlike primaries) produce particular sensory experiences [McGinn]
22421 Could there be a mind which lacked secondary quality perception? [McGinn]
22424 Secondary qualities contain information; their variety would be superfluous otherwise [McGinn]
22425 The utility theory says secondary qualities give information useful to human beings [McGinn]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
7629 We see objects 'directly' by representing them [McGinn]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
18410 Indexical thought is in relation to my self-consciousness [McGinn]
22417 Indexicals do not figure in theories of physics, because they are not explanatory causes [McGinn]
22420 The indexical perspective is subjective, incorrigible and constant [McGinn]
18402 Indexical concepts are indispensable, as we need them for the power to act [McGinn]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
10432 A new usage of a name could arise from a mistaken baptism of nothing [Sainsbury]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
10434 Even a quantifier like 'someone' can be used referentially [Sainsbury]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
22418 I can know indexical truths a priori, unlike their non-indexical paraphrases [McGinn]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
10431 Things are thought to have a function, even when they can't perform them [Sainsbury]