26 ideas
| 12463 | Unlike correspondence, truthmaking can be one truth to many truthmakers, or vice versa [Jacobs] |
| 10429 | It is best to say that a name designates iff there is something for it to designate [Sainsbury] |
| 10425 | Definite descriptions may not be referring expressions, since they can fail to refer [Sainsbury] |
| 10438 | Definite descriptions are usually rigid in subject, but not in predicate, position [Sainsbury] |
| 14375 | If structures result from intrinsic natures of properties, the 'relations' between them can drop out [Jacobs] |
| 14378 | Science aims at identifying the structure and nature of the powers that exist [Jacobs] |
| 12467 | Powers come from concrete particulars, not from the laws of nature [Jacobs] |
| 14377 | Possibilities are manifestations of some power, and impossibilies rest on no powers [Jacobs] |
| 14376 | States of affairs are only possible if some substance could initiate a causal chain to get there [Jacobs] |
| 14379 | Counterfactuals invite us to consider the powers picked out by the antecedent [Jacobs] |
| 14372 | Possible worlds are just not suitable truthmakers for modality [Jacobs] |
| 12466 | All modality is in the properties and relations of the actual world [Jacobs] |
| 14371 | We can base counterfactuals on powers, not possible worlds, and hence define necessity [Jacobs] |
| 12465 | Concrete worlds, unlike fictions, at least offer evidence of how the actual world could be [Jacobs] |
| 12464 | If some book described a possibe life for you, that isn't what makes such a life possible [Jacobs] |
| 12469 | Possible worlds semantics gives little insight into modality [Jacobs] |
| 3978 | Associations are held to connect Ideas together in the way the world is connected together [Fodor] |
| 3976 | Intentional science needs objects with semantic and causal properties, and which obey laws [Fodor] |
| 3980 | Intentional states and processes may be causal relations among mental symbols [Fodor] |
| 3981 | Most psychological properties seem to be multiply realisable [Fodor] |
| 3975 | Folk psychology explains behaviour by reference to intentional states like belief and desire [Fodor] |
| 3982 | How could the extrinsic properties of thoughts supervene on their intrinsic properties? [Fodor] |
| 10432 | A new usage of a name could arise from a mistaken baptism of nothing [Sainsbury] |
| 10434 | Even a quantifier like 'someone' can be used referentially [Sainsbury] |
| 10431 | Things are thought to have a function, even when they can't perform them [Sainsbury] |
| 3977 | Laws are true generalisations which support counterfactuals and are confirmed by instances [Fodor] |