15 ideas
16951 | It was realised that possible worlds covered all modal logics, if they had a structure [Dummett] |
16952 | If something is only possible relative to another possibility, the possibility relation is not transitive [Dummett] |
16953 | Relative possibility one way may be impossible coming back, so it isn't symmetrical [Dummett] |
16960 | If possibilitiy is relative, that might make accessibility non-transitive, and T the correct system [Dummett] |
16958 | In S4 the actual world has a special place [Dummett] |
6402 | In 1927, Russell analysed force and matter in terms of events [Russell, by Grayling] |
14732 | A perceived physical object is events grouped around a centre [Russell] |
14733 | An object produces the same percepts with or without a substance, so that is irrelevant to science [Russell] |
16957 | Possible worlds aren't how the world might be, but how a world might be, given some possibility [Dummett] |
16959 | If possible worlds have no structure (S5) they are equal, and it is hard to deny them reality [Dummett] |
6418 | Russell rejected phenomenalism because it couldn't account for causal relations [Russell, by Grayling] |
22688 | The Aristotelian idea that choices can be perceived needs literary texts to expound it [Nussbaum] |
16956 | To explain generosity in a person, you must understand a generous action [Dummett] |
16954 | Generalised talk of 'natural kinds' is unfortunate, as they vary too much [Dummett] |
21706 | At first matter is basic and known by sense-data; later Russell says matter is constructed [Russell, by Linsky,B] |