Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Origin of the Work of Art', 'Essence and Potentiality' and 'Approaches to Intentionality'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

15 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
15585 Later Heidegger sees philosophy as more like poetry than like science [Heidegger, by Polt]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
17954 Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
17953 Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
17952 Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
17959 Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
17955 Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter]
17957 Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
17958 The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
17956 Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
2986 Belief is the most important propositional attitude [Lyons]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
2978 Consciousness no longer seems essential to intentionality [Lyons]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
2984 Perceptions could give us information without symbolic representation [Lyons]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
2979 Propositional attitudes require representation [Lyons]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
2987 Folk psychology works badly for alien cultures [Lyons]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
2977 All thinking has content [Lyons]